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ABsr ACT 
The formal language CANDID is presented as a knowledge representa- 
tion formalism for artificially intelligent decision support systems. The 
language is specifically oriented to representation of concepts in finance, 
commerce and administration. Later parts of the paper demonstrate the 
application of CANDID to the explication of corporate entities and con- 
tractual objects, as well as to various concepts in elementary finance. 
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DJTRODUCTlON 
There is a growing interest in Decision Support Systems (DSS) 
research to incorporate the techniques and methods of Artificial Intelli- 
gence (AI), especially the areas of so-called knowledge-based expert sys- 
tems. (See for instance, the increasing emphasis on AI in the DSS texts 
by Keen and Scott-Morton (1978) Fick and Sprague (1980), and Bonczek, 
Holsapple and Whinston (1 981).) 
Expert systems are characterized by the ability to do non- 
deterministic, qualitative deductions on a knowledge-base about some 
particular problem domain. Some of the best know examples are: the 
MYCIN system for bacterial infection diagnosis and therapy (Shortliffe 
19?6), the DENDRAL system which computes structural descriptions of 
complex organic chemicals from their mass spectograms and related 
data (Buchanan and Feigenbaum 1978), and the MACSYMA system for 
mathemaical formula manipulation (Martin and Fateman 1971). 
A fundamental issue in the development of expert systems is the is 
the formalism for representing the contents of the knowledge base. The 
robustness of this formalism obviously determines the range of 
phenomena that can be discriminated and the types of deductions that 
can be performed on these descriptions. In AI, a variety of such formal- 
isms have been proposed (see Brachman and Smith (1980) for a survey). 
These divide (roughly) into those using graphical schemes (called 'seman- 
tic nets') and those based on symbolic logic. For reasons which will 
become clear later on, the orientation here utilizes the notation of sym- 
bolic logic. 
As argued in the above cited literature, a DSS might also usefully 
incorporate such knowledge-based inferencing techniques to 'intelli- 
gently' assist in decision making in some particular problem area. 
Our purpose in this paper is to present a knowledge representation 
formalism, called CANDID, which is specifically oriented to typical DSS 
applications, focusing on the representation of concepts in administra- 
tion, commerce and finance. 
However, there is a certain Mference in the requirements and prior- 
ities of a knowledge representation language for DSS's as proposed to 
expert systems. In an expert system one attempts to completely capture 
the expertise related to a given task. In a DSS, one typically addresses 
problems of greater complexity where a t  best only a partial formalization 
of the problem domain is possible. Hence, a DSS seeks to aid rather than 
replace the decision maker 
This raises an important me thodological issue regarding the develop- 
ment of formalisms for the representation of knowledge in these systems. 
In artificial intelligence, somewhat as in applied mathematics, a pri- 
mary emphasis is placed on deductive capability and efficiency, leaving 
the modeling capacity of the formalism as a secondary priority. Thus, it 
often happens that computational tools are developed, and refined, while 
their application remains a craft, e.g., of an operations researcher or a 
knowledge engineer. Under this approach, if one can describe a problem 
in the appropriate formalism, a computational solution is automatic. 
However, in decision support systems the philosophy is to attempt to 
go beyond the range of problems having completely structured computa- 
tional solutions, and attempt to address areas which may be only partially 
formalizable (at current levels of understand:-%). This raises the thorny 
issue of how we can attempt to describe these more complicated problem 
domains without resorting to subjective discourse (also known as 
'handwaving'). The challenge for problem domain description in decision 
support contexts is therefore the apparent contradiction of finding for- 
mal methods for describing only partially formalizable phenomena. 
There is a key, however, in the interpretation of the word "formal." 
Here we make use of a distinction from meta-logic (see, e.g., van Fraasen 
(1971)) between the formal  s e m a n t i c s  of a notation and its Logical 
a z b m a t i z a t i o n .  The formal semantics of the notation (what is usually 
called a formal  Language) provides an unambiguous denotation or object 
of reference for each symbol and com.bination of symbols allowed in the 
notation's syntax. Denotations are generally described in set  theoretical 
terms,  where the sets are  s e t s  of objects ,  such as  the set of people, the 
set of geographical location or sets of times. These sets may also coin- 
cidentally be symbolic objects such as numbers alphabetic letters, but 
these too are considered to be in a referential relationshp to the symbols 
in the notation. 
Two expressions in the notation are said to  be s e m a n t i c a l l y  
equ iva len t  if they denote the same objects. Hence semantic equivalence 
can only be verified by reference to these external sets. 
A logical axiornatization, on the other hand, involves a se t  of transfor- 
mations, called in fe rence  d e s ,  which have the claim that  if the inputs to  
these rules (called p r e m i s s e s )  are  t rue  expressions, then the output 
(called the conclusion) will also be a true expression. An important point 
is that these inference rules make use of purely syntactic information 
only. More broadly, if t ru th  values are considered among the sets of 
objects that  may be denoted, an inference rule asserts that i f  its input 
expressions, satisfying certain syntactic criteria, have a certain denota- 
tion, then its output expression will have a certain other denotation. 
However, the denotations themselves are  not examined. 
Application of an inference rule is called a deduct ion,  and if one 
expression can be  derived from on or more others by possibly many 
applications of these rules, it is said to be deducib le  from the other 
expressions. A se t  of axioms of the formal language is a set of expres- 
sions from which all other (valid) expressions may be deduced. 
A logic for a formal language comprises the sets  of inference rules 
and axioms. A logic is complete for the formal language if deducibility 
can be made to coincide with semantic equivalence. 
The relevance of this discussion to the methodological problem 
posed for decision support systems should become clear if we associate 
the concepts 
a. 'formal language' with 'knowledge representation scheme' 
b. 'formal semantics' with 'modeling capability' (of the representa- 
tion scheme). 
c .  ' deducibility' with 'computability.'* 
As argued above, a methodology appropriate for decision support 
systems is one that  places priority on modeling or what we might alterna- 
tively call formal description. This amounts to development of a 
representational scheme (formal language) with an  explicit and unambi- 
guous syntax and formal semantics. This formal semantics is described 
in terms of manipulations of sets of objects (some of whch may be syrn- 
bolic). 
The division of labor between a human user and the computer deci- 
sion support system for a particular problem domain described in such a 
formal language can now be described in rigorous terms: the potential of 
the DSS in this problem domain is precisely the range of deduciblity 
covered by the inference rules. 
*Strictly speaking. 'computable' should be translated as 'efficiently deduciblel-i.e., includ- 
ing an algorithm for applying the inference rules which halts in a reasonable amount of time. 
The purpose of t h s  work is thus one of "explication," Carnap's term 
for the task of "making more exact a vague or not quite exact concept 
used in everyday life or in an earlier stage of scientific or logical develop- 
ment.''* 
The conceptual vocabulary we seek to 'explicate' is the special termi- 
nology of commerce and finance: in particular the descriptive terminol- 
ogy found in accounting reports, financial and commercial contracts and 
administrative databases. 
Part of this terminology deals with the particular class of goods and 
services involved-e .g., household products, transportation, energy. This 
is what some organization theorists (e.g., Woodward (1978)) have called 
the technology of the organization, i.e., in a very broad sense, what the 
organization knows how to do that distinguishes it from other organiza- 
tions. For t h s  aspect, our calculus provides a general framework within 
which these application dependent concepts can be developed. 
On the other hand, there is a large number of concepts that are 
independent of the technology involved. This may be roughly divided into 
concepts relating to the organization's bureaucrat ic  s t ruc ture ,  i.e., its 
system of authority, and the organization's contractual s t m c t u ~ e ,  i.e., its 
commitments to other parties. (Ths is only an approximate distinction; 
bureaucratic structure will later be re-cast as set  of interrelationshps 
between contracts to employees.) 
* Carnap, R. Meanang und Necessity, Chicago, Univ, of Chicago Press, 1847, p.7 cited in 
Cresswe11 (1973), p.3. 
The goal in CANDID is to explicate these types of concepts-e.g., what 
is a contract? what is common stock? what is an asset? a liability? what 
distmguishes a proprietorship, an partnership and a corporation? 
Our goal here is therefore one of description rather than normative 
prescription. 
We should note that the goal in accounting is also one of description 
of similar phenomena. However the objectives here are in fact comple- 
mentary to those in accounting. Accounting is concerned with the ualua- 
tion of these phenomena (in monetary terms). Our goal is the description 
of these phenomena independent of such valuations. (This work, insofar 
as it succeeds, therefore offers a descriptive foundation for accounting 
theory.) 
Our goal, therefore, is to reduce this conceptual vocabulary to a set 
of primitive concepts about which there is no ambiguity. (The relation- 
ship to DSS knowledge bases is discussed in more detail in the next sec- 
tion.) 
What we so far lack is a criterion for when we have arrived; put other- 
wise, why is the informal terminology presently in use not sufficient? Our 
reply is based on the philosophcal work of Strawson (1959), who exam- 
ines the necessary frame of reference needed for consensual understand- 
ing of objects and concepts. His conclusion is that the underlying basis 
for such understanding is its location in a spatial temporal framework. 
For our purposes, this will be interpreted as an domain of discourse 
consisting of physical objects (having mass), including of course people, 
existing in the present or past. 
One problem that immediately arises is the individuation of such 
objects, especially in the case of granualar substances and liquids or 
gases. As a simplification, which is realistic in most commercial contexts, 
we will assume these to be located in a container which can in turn be 
individuated and uniquely identified in time and space. 
The question arises why we limit this domain of discourse to objects 
in the past and present, and not include the continuation of these objects, 
as well as other objects, in the future. Our response is that whle a given 
spatial coordinate-at a future point in time can only be occupied by one 
physical object, we do not know whether or not it does. Thus the future 
will appear in CANDID as a framework of possibility, whereas the past and 
present constitute a framework of fact.  
If we consider only the physical products and activities of an organi- 
zations, its explication in this domain of discourse would be relatively 
straightforward (though perhaps tedious) 
However, the financial and bureaucratic concepts present a profound 
challenge. Consider the elementary concept of money. Cash is of course 
a physical object, but that is probably among the least interesting of its 
aspects. Similarly, a bond or a common stock is represented by a paper 
certificate, but again the real import of this object is sornethng beyond 
that. 
On the bureaucratic side, consider: what is a corporation? Is it the 
collection of its assets? No, for the corporation owns its assets and is 
therefore separate from them. Is it the collection of its employees? No, 
for the corporation contracts with its employees for their work, and is 
therefore separate from them. Is it the collection of its stockholders? 
No, for the  corporation is owned by its stockholders, hence separate from 
them. What is it then? 
Within t h s  arises the issue of organizational authority. What is 
meant that  x has authority over y? This is surely quite different than a 
simple physical relationship. 
These a re  the sorts of phenomena we are  attempting to  explicate in 
the CANDID calculus. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into three parts. In Par t  I, the 
syntax and formal semantics of the CANDID language are developed. In 
Parts I1 and I11 we illustrate how CANDID can be applied to the description 
of financial and commercial phenomena. In Part  11, the entities, that is 
the principal actors and objects of economic activity, are considered. In 
Par t  111, various elementary concepts of finance are  explicated using CAN- 
DID. 

PART I: SYNTAX AND FORMAL SEXAIVTICS OF CANDID 
CONTENT 
The Language L1 
Re-interpretation of Predicates 
Many Sorted, Type Theoretic Languages 
Lambda Abstraction 
Operations, Definite Reference 
Summary of the Language LT 
Character Strings, Labels 
Numbers and Measurement 
Time, Realization, Change 
Possible Worlds, Intensions 
Summary of the Language, IL 
Action 
Models, Deontic operators 
Summary of the Language CANDID 
Thls par t  presents form the syntax and formal semantics of the 
language we have called CANDID, originally described in Lee (1980). 
In the discussion which follows, the reader is presumed to be familiar 
with the first order predicate calculus (FOPC), whch we take as our start- 
ing point. For background, we suggest that  the text by Kalish, Montague 
and Mar (1980). The extensions to this which comprise CANDID are drawn 
chiefly from Montague's "intensional logic" (Montague 1973, Dowty 1978), 
and von Wright's "deontic logic" (von Wright 1965, 1967 and 1968), with 
minor influence from the temporal logic of Rescher and Urquhart (1971). 
The presentation given here is a model theoretic one. Background on 
model theory is giving in Dowty (1978) and Kalish e t  al. (1980) mentioned 
above. Deeper coverage is provided in van Fraasen (1971) and Chang and 
Keisler ( 1973). 
The CANDID language as described here loosely follows the develop- 
ment of Montague's Intensional Logic as presented in Dowty (1978). aug- 
mented with the operators of von Wright's Deontic Logic. The principle 
differences up to the language IL (Intentional Logic) are as follows: 
- addition of operations and the definite reference operator, 1 
- omission of the tense operators, P and F (past and future) 
- addition of the sets  C (character strings) and N (numbers) in the 
model. 
- recognition of time (designated as the se t  T rather than J) withln 
the object language; addition of the operator R for temporal 
realization (adapted from a similar notation by Rescher and 
Urguhart (1971). 
The language IL is then extended to include the connectives and 
operators of von Wright's deontic logic with the following modifications: 
- addition of an agent place in the I connective. 
- re-interpretation of contingent permission and obligation. 
- addition of operators for  contractual obligation and permission, 
and the connective OE (or else). 
General Notational Conventions 
Throughout this paper we will describe a series of formal languages 
of increasing complexity. The formal language itself will be called the 
object language,  whereas its description is done via a metalanguage.  
Object Language<on.st an ts  
In the object language, constant n a m e s  will be strings of upper or 
lower case Roman letters or digits or dashes, beginning with a capital 
letter.  These will designate individuals in the domain. Later, the object 
language is extended to include symbolic entities, i.e., character strings 
and numbers. These may be desgnated directly in the language, without 
the intermediate device of a constant name. Character string constants 
will be shown between double quotes, e.g.,  "string," and numeric con- 
stants will have the usual Arabic notation, with an  optional embedded 
decimal point, e .g. ,  1, 2, 3. For consistency these designations will be 
treated as names for themselves. Thus the general notation for constants 
is tha t  they begin with a capital letter,  digit or double quote. 
Object Language-Variables 
Variables will be denoted as one or more lower case letters, with an 
optional subscript; e .g . ,  x, y, 21, 22. 
Metalanguage 
In the metalanguage, constants will be represented using the Greek 
characters, a, 8 ,  y, @, +. Variables will be designated in the metalanguage 
by the characters p and v. 
I-A. THE LANGUAGE L1 
L1 is a fairly standard version of a first order predicate calculus with 
equality. 
Syntax of L, 
B& libpressions 
C a s t a n t s :  
Individual Constants: will be denoted as a capital letter followed by 
one or more lower case letters, e.g.,  A, B, Tom, Dick, Harry. 
Individual Variables: are denoted as one or more lower case letters 
with an optional subscript, e.g.,  x, y, z l ,  zz. 
Predicate constants: are denoted as one or more capital letters, 
e.g., P, Q, RED. Each predicate has associated zero or more places.  (A 
zero place predicate is called a proposition.) 
Terms:  
A t e rm in Ll is an individual variable or an individual constant. 
Formation W e s  of L 
A well formed formula (wff) of L1 is defined recursively as follows: 
1. If 9 is a predicate of n places, (n  0) and al, . . . ,an are terms, 
then @(a,, . . . , a n )  is a wff. 
2-6. If 9 and + are wffs, then so are: 
2. "9 
3. a & *  
4. 9 v *  
5. 9-+ \k  
6. 9 - +  
7-8. If p is a variable and @ a wff, then: 
7. Wp@isawff  
8. gp iP is a wff 
A variable f i  is bound in a formula 9 iff it occurs in iP within a sub- 
formula of the form V p  @ or 3 p  @; otherwise the variable is free in 9.  
A sentence is a wff containing no free variables. 
Semantics of L1 
A model for L1 is an ordered pair <D, F> such that D (the u n i v e r s e  of 
d i s course )  is a non-empty set and F (the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  f u n c t i o n )  .is a 
func t ion  as s ign ing  a deno ta t ion  to each constant of L1 (i.e.,  to indwidual 
constants and predicate constants). The set  of possible denotations of 
individual constants is D. The set  of possible denotations of one place 
predicates is p ( d )  (where is the power set of D, i.e., the set  of all sub- 
sets). The set of possible denotations for an n place predicate is P(Dn 
where Dn = I <dl ,. .., dn> I dl  E D,. .  .,dn E Dl. 
The set of possible denotations for a 0 place predicate (proposition), 
is the set ITrue, False]. 
An a s s i g n m e n t  of v a l u e s  t o  v a r i a b l e s  (or v a l u e  a s s i g n m e n t )  g is any 
function assigning a member of D to each variable of L1. DenMag (a)" is the 
abbreviation for "denotation of a with respect to M ang g" "true wrto M,g" 
abbreviates "true with respect to a model M and value assignment g." 
Denotations of Basic Ezpressions of L1 
(reLative to a mode l  <D, a n d  v a l u e  a s s i g n m e n t  g )  
1. If @ is an individual variable of L1, then DenMBg (p) = g(p). 
2. If a is a (non-logical) constant of L1, then DenM,g (a) = F(a) 
M h  Condi twns  fm Formulae of L1 
( re la t ive  to a mode l  <D, F> a n d  Value Ass ignment  g )  
1. If Ip is an n place predicate and al,  . . . ,an  are terms, then 
@(al ,  . . . , a n )  is true wrto M,g iff DenMBg < a l ,  . . . , a n )  E DenMsg a .  
2. If @ is a wff, then DenM, ("a) = true iff DenMeg (a) = False 
3-6. If @ and + are wffs, then 
3. DenM,[$ & +] = True iff DenMsg(@) = True and DenM,(+) = 
True 
4. DenMK[@ V +] = True iff either DenMsg($) = True or DenMK(+) 
= True. 
5. Densrag[@ --, 'k] = True iff either  en^,^($) = False or else 
DenMmg(+) = True 
6. DenMmg[@ - 'k] = True iff either (a) DenM,($) = True and 
Dem,(+) = True or (b) DenM,(@) = False and DenM,(+) = 
False 
7 .  If @ is a formula and p is a variable, then DenMag(t/p@) = True iff 
for every value assignment g' such that g' is exactly like g 
except possibly for the individual assignment to p by g ' ,  
DenMmg.(@) = True. 
8. If @ is a formula and p is a variable then ~ e n ~ , ~ ( g p @ )  = True iff 
there is some value assignment, g' ,  such that g' is exactly like g 
except possibly for the value assigned to  us by g' and DenM,.($) 
= True. 
T d h  Conditio7ls fur Formulae of L1 Relative to  a Model M 
1. A formula of L1 is t-me w i t h  respect to A4 if for all value assign- 
ments g, DenM,($) = True 
2. A formula 9 of L1 is f a l s e  with r e s p e c t  t o  M if for all value assign- 
ment g, Denu,g(9) = False. 
Note: If a formula 9 is a sentence or proposition (i.e.,  with no free 
variables), then it will turn out that DenM.,(@) = True with respect to M 
and all value assignments, g (hence true with respect to M by 1. above) or 
else DenM,(@) = False with respect to M and all value assignments (hence 
false with respect to M and all value assignments (hence false with 
respect to M, by 2. above). It can never be true with respect to M and 
some value assignments and false with respect to other value assign- 
ments. 
However, if 9 has one or more free variables, then it may be true 
with respect to some assignments and false with respect to others. In 
this case its truth or falsity is simply undefined by the above rules. 
I-B. RE-INTEHPRIRATION OF PREDICATES 
In the preceding section, a one place predicate was regarded as 
denoting a subset of the domain D. Hence, for a term a and a predicate 
9 ,  @(a)  is true (denotes True) if and only if the t h n g  a denotes is an ele- 
ment of the set denoted by 9. 
Similarly for n-place pre&cates, 9 is viewed as an n-place relation on 
D, and is true of n terms, a l ,  . . . ,a, i f f  the n-tuple of entities they denote 
is an  element of the relation denoted by 9. 
This interpretation will now be modified slightly. Consider first the 
case of a one place predicate. Suppose we had a domain, D, consisting of 
five individuals as follows: 
and a predicate, P, whose denotation is as follows: 
Here, P is true (denotes True) of the individuals in t h s  set and is false 
(denotes False) of the individuals not in this set. 
These denotations of True and False can be made explicit by describ- 
ing the characteristic finction of P.  This is a function that maps any indi- 
vidual in D to True or False, according to whether it is in the subset of D 
denoted by P. For instance, the characteristic function in this case is the 
set of pairs: 
The information conveyed here is essentially that of the previous 
subset plus the interpretation of elementhood conveying the t ruth  of the 
predicate applied to its argument. However here, this interpretation is 
conveyed directly. 
That is, let us henceforth view a one place predicate as denoting the 
characteristic function of the set of elements for whch it is true. 
Then the denotation of the predicate applied to an argument is sim- 
ply the result of functional application of this argument to the charac- 
teristic function, i.e., if @ is a one place predicate and a is a term, then 
D e n ~ . ~ ( @ a )  = Den~,(@)(Den~.,(a)). 
For instance, in the above example, if a is D l ,  then Den(@a) = True if 
a is D2, then Den(@a) = False. 
We might similarly extend this so that two place predicates denoted 
sets of triples, mapping two individuals to a truth value, and that n place 
predicates denoted n + l  tuples mapping n individuals to a truth value. 
However, it will provide more flexibility later on if we regard a two 
place predicate not as a function of two arguments mapping to truth 
values, but as a function of one argument mapping to another function of 
one argument which maps to a truth value. 
Thus a predicate of any number of places is considered to denote a 
function of only one argument whose result is either another function or a 
truth value. (The idea of functions which have other functions as values 
may seem strange-except perhaps to LISP programmers. Its motivation 
will become clear when we introduce lambda abstraction.) 
To incorporate this new interpretation, the language L, is modified as 
follows : 
Replace formation rule 1 with 
Syn,la. If Q is a one place predicate and a is a term, then Q a  is a 
wff. 
Syn.2a. If @ is an n place predicate and a is a term, then @ a  is an 
n-1 place predicate. 
Replace semantic rule 1 with: 
Sem.1. If @ is an n place predicate (N r 1) and a is a term, then 
D e n ~ . ~ ( @ a )  = Den~&(@)(Den~,Ja)) .  
Note that  the previous notation @(al,az, . . . , a,) now takes the form 
@(al)  (az) ... (a,). The former notation will still be used on occasion to  
abbreviate the latter however. 
I€. MANY SORTH). TYPE T H E O r n C  LANGUAGES 
A many- sorted formal language is one that assumes there is a non- 
empty set  I whose members are called swts. For each sort i, there are 
variables v!, VA ,... that  belong to  sort i. Also for each sort i there is a 
(possibly empty) set of constant symbols of sort i. 
For each n > 0 and each n-type <il, . . . ,in> of sorts, there is a (possi- 
bly empty) set  of predicates, each of which is said to be of sort 
<il, . . . , in>. For each sort i there is a universal and existential quantif- 
ier,  Vi and gi. A many sorted logic can be embedded in a first order 
predicate calculus and therefore does not have any more power (Ender- 
ton 1972). 
A many sorted approach will prove valuable later when we extend the 
domain of the formal language to  include in addition to entities (whose 
designation we leave imprecise until later), character strings, numbers 
and times. 
The purpose of a many sorted language is t o  coordinate references 
among the several domains of discourse representing each sort. As noted 
above, these references remain "first-order," i.e., only individual and pro- 
perties and relationshps of individuals (in&cated by predicates) are 
represented in the language. 
Recall that in the previous section we modified the interpretation of 
a predicate so that it no longer denoted a set or relation on a domain, but 
rather characteristic functions of such sets. 
Rather than orient the formal language towards the first order 
framework of a multi-sorted language, we will instead continue the 
development begun in the last section and introduce a more general 
framework that includes the multiple domain features of a multi-sorted 
language. Such a language is called a higher- order t y p e -  theoretic 
language (the name derives from origins in Russell's simple theory of 
types.) 
Basically, a type is like a sort as described above, except that a type 
may be not only a class of individuals (like a sort), but classes of higher 
order objects (e.g., sets, sets of sets) as well. So far, the elementary 
types we have discussed are: individuals in the domain, designated as 
type "e" (for "entity"), and truth values, which we designate as type "v" 
(!?om Latin, v e r i t a s ;  the obvious abbreviation "t" is reserved for time, 
which appears later). 
The set of types, called Type, is defined recursively as follows: 
(1) e is a type 
(2) v is a type 
(3) if a and b are any types, then <a,b> is a type. 
The members of Type are labels of categories. The notation ME,, (the 
meaningful  e z p r e s s i m  of type a) denotes the set  of expressions of type 
a itself. 
By way of example 
a formula or proposition is of type v. 
a one place predicate is of type <e,v>. 
a two place predicate is of type <e,<e,v>>. 
" is of type <v,v>. 
connectives (&, V, +, -) are all of type <v,<v,v>> 
I-D. LAMBDA A B ~ ~ I O N  
Using set notation, a set may be defined extensionally, listing its ele- 
ments, e.g.,  
or "intensionally," by means of some predicate that selects from the 
domain a subset of individuals, e.g., 
is the set of all in&viduals satisfying P, 
Ths brace notation thus provides the means for constructing hgher  
order sets from a predicate. 
But, by our first interpretation of predicates, they themselves 
denoted sets, e.g., as Den(P). Thus substituting, 
In our revised interpretation, however, the denotation of P was modi- 
fied to be the characteristic function of t h s  set. The device for referring 
to this in the object language is the so-called lambda operator, A. 
Thus, for P a one place predicate, 
is the set  of ordered pairs of the form <e,v>, one pair for each individual 
in the domain, which assigns True or False i f  P is true or false of that indi- 
vidual respectively. 
Whle we have introduced lambda in terms of individuals and one 
place predicates, it can in fact be generalized to apply to  expressions and 
variables of any type. 
This involves the following additions to the syntactic and semantic 
rules: 
S yn. If a E ME, and p is a variable of type b, then Apa E ME<be,,. 
Sem. If a E ME, and p is a variable of type b, then DenMog (Apa) is 
that  function h from Db into D, such that for all objects k in 
Db, h(k) is equal to DenMag.(a), where g '  is that variable 
assignment exactly like g except for the possible difference 
that  g'(p) = k. 
Note that lambda abstraction takes the role of set definition and 
functional aplication the role of set membership in the object Languages 
we are developing, whereas traditional set concepts are used in the 
metalanguage definitions. 
In later parts, where we illustrate the use of CANDID with examples, it 
will occassionally be convenient to revert back to traditional set  notation 
because of its familiarity. For t h s  reason, we incude the following addi- 
tional definitions in the object  l a n g u a g e .  
For a predicate @ and variable p, 
To repeat, while set  notation may thus be used in the object  
l a n g u a g e ,  its interpretation is in terms of lambda abstraction and 
characteristic functions. In the m e t a l a n g u a g e  definitions, set notation is 
used in the normal way. 
I-E. OPERATIONS. DEFINITE m N C E  
The expressions discussed so far have all been of the type e or <a,v> 
where a is some other, possibly complex, type. 
An opera t ion  is an expression of the form <a,b> where b is an ele- 
mentary type other than v. At the current level of the language, the only 
expressions that qualify are of the form <a,e>, i.e., expressions whch 
result in an individual, when applied to an argument. Indeed, an indivi- 
dual constant may be regarded as a 0-place operation. 
Operations may thus serve as arguments to predicates, e.g., for the 
predicate "ITALIAN," the operation, "Father," 
asserts that John's father is Italian. 
Note: to aid readability in the examples, we adapt the following prac- 
tice for constant names: constants denoting individuals (individual con- 
stants and operations) are given names beginning with a capital letter, 
followed by lower case. Other constants, including predicates, are given 
names all in upper case. 
Operations serving as arguments to predicates is included in the 
definition of functional application given in the preceding section; i.e., the 
argument to a functor of type <a,b> may be any meaningful expression of 
type a,  this includes operations as well as variables and constants. 
For instance, in the above example 
John E ME, 
Father E MEceve> 
ITALIAN E MEce,"> 
so that ,  by functional application 
Father(John) E ME, 
ITALIAN(Father(J0hn)) E ME,. 
(The quantifiers Wand 3 as well as the lambda operator, A, are con- 
fined by definition to variables only.) 
Note that by combining an operation with a predicate of equality we 
can define a corresponding predicate: 
FATHE.R(x,y) : : = y=Father (x) 
A new operator, the so-called descriptive or iota operator, L will allow 
us to make definitions in the other direction. 
Ths operator has the following syntactic and semantic rules: 
Syn. If @ E ME,,,,, and k is a variable of type a ,  then LF@ E MEa 
Sem.For 9 E ME,,,, and k a variable of type a ,  if for some constant c, 
DenMagVk[@(k) - k=c] = True, then DenM,(Lk@k) = c. 
Note that  by this definition, the expression L F @ ~  has a denotation 
only if @ is true of just one individual; otherwisei .e. ,  if @ is true of no 
individuals or more than one individual--the denotation of L F @ ~  is unde- 
fined. 
Expressions of the form "~k@" are read "the unique k such that @." 
Iota is thus an operation forming operator. For example, the earlier 
operation Father(x), could be formed from the predicate FATHER(x,~) as 
follows: 
Comment: By way of comparison Ak@k denotes the set (or rather 
characteristic function thereof) of individuals satisfying @. This may, 
coincidentally, be a set with only one element (characteristic function 
with only one domain value mapping to True), or indeed it may be the null 
set. 
L F @ ~ ,  on the other hand, denotes a single individual if it denotes at  
all. 
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I-F. SUMMARY OF THE LANGUAGE Lr 
The language L, incorporates the features discussed thus far: 
Syntax of 4 
The set  of types of Lt is the set defined as follows: 
1). e is a type 
2) v is a type 
3) if a and b are types, then <a,b> is a type. 
The basic expressions of Lt consists of 
1) for each type a, the set  of (non-logical) constants of type a ,  
denoted Con,. (Names for particular constants follow the con- 
ventions defined earlier: all constants names begin with a capi- 
tal letter. Names of constants which refer to entities, have the 
remainder spelled in lower case; all other constants have names 
spelled entirely in upper case. 
2) for each type a ,  the set  of variables of  type a ,  denoted Var,. 
(Names for variables are as before, i.e., lower case letters with 
an optional numeric subscript.) 
3) for each type a,  the set of terms of type a,  denoted Term,, are 
defined recursively as follows: 
- if a E Con, then a E Term, 
- if a E Var, then a E Term, 
- if . . . , P,., are terms of type x, ,..., x, respectively and 9 is 
an operation of type <xl,.  .. , <x,,a>> then @ ( P I ,  . . . , Pn E 
Term,. 
- if u E Var, and iP E MEca,,>, whose only unbound variable is 
p, then ~piP E Term,. 
Fmmcrtim N e s  of 4 
The set of meaningful expressions of type a,  denoted "ME,", for any 
type a (the well formed expressions for each type) is defined recursively 
as follows: 
1. For each type a,  every variable and constant of type a is in ME,. 
2. If a E MEcasb> and P E ME,, then a ( @ )  E MEb. 
3. If a E ME, and k is  a variable of type b, then A k a  E 
4. If a and f? are  terms of type a, then [a=/J ]  E ME,. 
5.  If iP E and 1 E Var, then E ME,. 
6-10.If iP and * are in ME,, then so are: 
6. [-a] 
7.  [ i P  & *I 
0. [ ie v *I 
9. [ i P  *I 
l o .  [a - *I 
11-12.If ie E ME, and 1 is a variable (of any type) then 
11. [t/k@] E ME,. 
12. [3p@] E M E , .  
Semantics of 4 
Given a non-empty set D (the domain of i n d i v i d u a l s  or en t i t i e s ) ,  the 
set of possible denotation of meaningful expressions of type a (abbrevi- 
ated D,) is given by the following recursive definition 
(1) D, = D 
(2) D, = {True, False] 
D (3) D<a,b, = Dba for any types a and b. 
(the notation of the form yX is the set of all possible functions from the 
set X into the set Y.) 
A model  for Lr is an ordered pair <D,  F> such that D is as above and F 
is a function assigning a denotation to each constant of Lr of type a from 
the set  D,. 
An a s s i g n m e n t  of v a l u e s  to  v a r i a b l e s  (or simply a v a r i a b l e  ass ign-  
ment) g is a f u n c t i o n  as s ign ing  to each  v a r i a b l e  k € Var, denotation from 
the set  D,, for each type a. 
The denotation of an expression a of Lr relative to a model M and 
variable assignment g is defined recursively as follows: 
1. If a is a constant, then Debeg(a  = F(a). 
2. If a is a variable then DenMbg(a) = g(a).  
3. If a E MEcab> and @ E ME,, then DenM, (a (@))  = 
D e ~ , ~ ( a ) ( D e u , , ( @ ) ) .  (i.e., the result of applying the function 
DenM,,(a) to the argument DenM,(@)). 
4. If a E ME, and p E Varb, then DenM,(Apa) is that function h from 
Db into D, such that for all objects k in Db, h(k) is equal to DenM,,, 
where g' is that variable assignment exactly like g except for the 
possible difference that gl(p) = k. 
5. If a and @ are terms of type a, then DenM,g(a=@) is True iff 
DenM,g(a) is the same as DenM,g(@). 
6. For @ = MEcast, and p E Var,, if for some constant, c ,  DenMng V p  
[@p - p=c] = True, then Den~,,(~p@p] = c. (Otherwise the 
expression LU@U has no denotation defined.) 
7-1 1 .For @ and \k in ME, 
7. DenM,("@) = True iff ~enM,~(@) = False 
8. DenM,,[@ & \k] = True iff DenM,,(@) = True and DenM,,(+) = 
True. 
9. DenMeg[@ V +] = True iff DenM,(@) = True or DenM,,(+) = 
True. 
10. Dem,[@ J 4'1 = True iff either DenMag(@) = False or else 
DenM,(*) = True. 
11.  en^,[@ - \k] = True iff either a) DenM,(@) = True and 
DenM,(*) = True or b) DenM,(@) = False and DenMag(*) = 
False. 
12. If 4, E ME, and p is a variable, then DenMs(Vp4,) = True iff for all 
g'  such that g' is exactly like g except possibly for the value 
assigned to p, = True. 
13. If iP E ME, and p is a variable, then ~ e n ~ , ~ ( 3 p i P )  = True iff  there 
is some g' exactly like g except possibly for the value assigned 
to p and DenM4.(@) = True. 
I-G. CHARACI'ER STFUNGS, -IS 
We now introduce a new elementary type, called a character string, 
abbreviated by the type name, c. The set of types (Type) is therefore 
extended as follows: 
e is a type 
c is a type 
v is a type 
if x and y are types, then <x,y> is a type. 
The set of elementary characters is the set Char where 
Char = !A, B, ..., Z, 0, 1, ..., 9, . ,  - {  
Ths character set is sufficient for our purposes here. It can be 
extended as needed to include e.g., lower case letters, special character 
markings such as accents, circumflex, cedilla, tilde, or completely dif- 
ferent alphabets such as Cyrillic or Greek. 
The set C of character strings is the set of n-place relations defined 
on Char, i.e., 
where Char" is Char x Char x Char ..., n times. 
A character string constant is therefore an n tuple <a,, az, ..., a,> 
where ai E C. This will henceforth be abbreviated 
i.e., a character string constant is a string of characters from the above 
set C listed between double quotes. 
Various computer languages, such as SNOBOL, provide a rich vocabu- 
lary of predicates and operations on strings. Here we make use of only 
the bare minimum of such a vocabulary, namely predicate of equality 
which is defined for all types in the calculus. Again this could be 
extended as needed for diverse applications. 
Here the principle interest in character strings is with operations of 
the form <e,c>. Ths  is a mapping from an entity to a character string, 
what we call a label .  Example of labels are: 
Last-Name(x) = "SMITH" 
First-Name(y) = "JOHN" 
Corp-Name(z) = "GENERAL MOTORS" 
Vehcle-Number(a) = "N33E76" 
Social-Security-Number(b) = "474-52-4829" 
As is probably evident from these examples, a label is an association 
of a character string with an individual for identification purposes only. 
Labels may or may not provide unique identification, as the above exam- 
ples illustrate. 
I-H. NUMBERS AND MEASUREMENT 
Another elementary type is now added, that  of numbers, which we 
take to be the real numbers. The set of numbers is designated as N ,  and 
the elementary type, number, is abbreviated n. The set  of types is now 
extended as follows: 
e is a type 
c is a type 
n is a type 
v is a type 
if x and y are types, then <x,y> is a type. 
Numeric constants are denoted in the common way as a string of 
Arabic digits, with an optional imbedded decimal point and an optional 
leading sign, e.g., 0, 1.2, -3.7. 
The one-place predicate I (i,e., of type <n,x>, designates the set* of 
integers. 
As for all types, the predicate "=" is assumed. Further, a linear ord- 
ering, indicated by the predicate "<" is assumed. Based on these, plus 
negation, the other numeric inequalities are easily derived. The notation 
is as follows, for a and /3 terms of type n: 
a = / 3  a equals /3 
a < / 3  a less than /3 
a less than or equal to /3 
Technically, the characteristic function thereof. 
a > @  a  greater than @ 
a r B  a  greater than or equal to @ 
a  not equal to @ 
These predicates are all of type <n,<n,v>>. 
The following operations, of type <n<n,n>> are also assumed: 
For a  and @ terms of type n: 
a + @  addition 
a - B  subtraction 
a * @  multiplication 
a / @  division 
a  * + B  exponentiation. 
Our principle interest in numbers in CANDID is as they are related to 
entities (and later, times). 
An operation of type <x,t>,  where x is a term of type e, is called a 
m e a s u r e m e n t  func t ion :  i.e., it is a mapping from the entities to the 
numbers (or a subset thereof). For instance, 
indicates that x is 6.5 meters tall. 
In the theory of measurement, a measurement is generally taken to 
involve a so-called measurement  qperat ion and a measurement  s t a n d a r d .  
Measurement standards are the sorts of objects maintained by e.g., the 
National Bureau of Standards in Washington D.C.,  whlch have some special 
property against which other objects are to be gauged. Thus a particular 
rod is regarded as the standard meter for the country. (A more pic- 
turesque example: the roundish stone on the front of St. Stephan's 
cathedral in the center square of Vienna was used in medieval times as a 
standard for the size of a loaf of bread.) 
A measurement operation is the procedure by which another object 
is compared to the standard. This procedure may be direct, e.g., by 
allgning the object against the standard meter, or indirect, through the 
use of intermediating measurement devices (rulers measuring tapes, 
etc.) which are ultimately compared to the standard. 
In the formal language, a measurement operation is regarded as a 
(formal) operation, while a measurement standard is an individual con- 
stant. For instance, we may modify the last example to be: 
Here Height is a measurement operation and Meter is a measurement 
standard. Note that measurement operations are numeric terms and 
thus may appear as arguments to other numeric predicates and opera- 
tions. E.g., to assert measurement unit convertibility from inches to cen- 
timeters: 
b'x Height(x,Cm) = 2.5 + Height(x,Inch) 
where Cm and Inch are measurement standards. 
I-I. TIME. REALIZATION, CHANGE 
Another elementary type is now added, consisting of elementary 
points in time. The set of times (past present and future) is denoted T, 
and its corresponding type, t .  
The set  of types is thus extended as follows: 
e is a type 
c is a type 
n is a type 
t is a type 
v is a type 
if x and y are types, then <x,y> is a type. 
Equality, "=", and "<", a linear ordering, are assumed as predicates 
on T. With the aid of negation and disjunction, other temporal relations 
are defined in a straightforward way. If a and #I are terms of type t ,  these 
have the following interpretation: 
a = p  a is the same time (point) as #I 
a < p  a is earlier than p 
a s p  a is earlier or equal to p 
a > p  a is later than /3 
a r p  a is later or equal to p 
a # @  a is not equal to /I 
Lastly, the predicate NEXT, indicates adjacent points in time. 
NEXT(a,p) ::= a < /3 & Vu (u it a)  & (u it p) --, "(a < u < p). 
In many cases, our interest is not with points in time, but rather 
time intervals or spans. A time span is the set of points between and 
including two time points. Ths is provided by the operation Span, of type 
<t,<t,<t,v>>>: 
Span ::= Ax Ay Az [(z 2 x) & (z r y)]. 
For two time points, a and @, 
is the set (technically, characteristic function) of points between and 
includmg these two points. Further, for a t h r d  time point, 7, 
Span(a) (@)(7) 
evaluates True or False depending whether 7 is between a and @ or not. 
(Note: as we have defined it, Span can also be used to select an interval 
of numbers.) Conversely, it is often convenient to go in the opposite direc- 
tion to obtain the beginning and end points of a time span: 
Beg ::= Ax ~y 2 z  [x = Span(y,z)] 
End ::= Ax LZ 2 y  [x = Span(y,z)] 
Thus, for a time span a,  Beg(a) is its beginning point, End(a) is its ending 
point. 
I t  is also occasionally useful to express that one time span is con- 
tained withn another. We call t h s  PT (for part) 
Thus for two time spans a and 8, PT(a)(@) says that 8 begins after a and 
ends before it. 
As noted, Span(a)(p) results in (map to) a set  of time points of type 
<t,v>. Many of these time spans have familiar labels, as provided by the 
Gregorian calendar, e.g., 28 February, 1981 and 10 July, 1984 are two indi- 
vidual day time spans, February 1981 and July 1984 are two individual 
month time spans and 1981 and 1984 are two individual year time spans. 
Reference to the time span constants labeled by the Gregorian calendar 
will be provided by three operations: 
Date of type <n,<n,<n,<t,v>>>> 
Mo of type <n,<n,<t,v>>> 
Y r of type <n,<t,v>>. 
That is, each of these maps (three, two or one) numbers to time 
spans, where months are specified by an integer 1-12. Thus the operation 
Date imitates the informal notation, e .g . ,  28/2/81. the time spans men- 
tioned above would thus be, 






Further, we often want to apply numeric measurement to time 
spans. For t h s  we use the measurement operation Dur (for duration). 
Thus for a time span a, a temporal measurement standard p and a 
number y ,  
is read that the duration of a in terms of /I is y. 
The choice of measurement standards is however somewhat prob- 
lematic in the case of time spans. Standards such as Second, Minute and 
Hour pose no particular problems since these are precisely determined 
based on a particular physical phenomenon (e.g., movement of a standard 
pendulum, molecular vibrations of quarts). Generally for commercial 
purposes however we have need of larger size units, e.g., days, months, 
years. 
Following the procedure recommended earlier, suppose we chose one 
particular month to serve as our standard-ay, January 1981. Then, the 
duration of a year, e.g., 1983, in terms of t h s  standard month would be: 
If, however, we take the next month as our standard, i.e., February, 
1981, we would have: 
Neither of these accords with the popular usage that a year comprises 
twelve months. 
A similar, though slightly less serious problem arises in the choice of 
a standard year, since leap years do not have the same number of days as 
other years. 
Indeed, even the choice of a standard day has potential difficulties, 
since the length of the last day in a century is slightly longer than the 
rest. 
This however seems to be a tolerable level of inaccuracy. Thus, we 
may take as our standard, call it Day, any of the non end of the century 
days or equivalently, define it in terms of standard hours, minutes or 
seconds. Thus, for example, 
We next consider the association of times to entities. For this we 
adopt a notation suggested by Rescher and Urquhard (1971) where for a 
time point, a, and a formula @ 
is read that @ is "realized" a t  time a. E.g., if iP is the formula "it is rain- 
ing," this expression would be true at  certain times, false at others. 
Including this in our formal language would obviously require a syn- 
tactic rule like: 
Syn. If a is a term of type t and @ E M E , ,  then R(a)@ is in ME,. 
However, the inclusion of the R operator will lead us to revise our 
semantic format somewhat. Like character strings and numbers, time 
points are merely another sort added to the object language. Viewed this 
way, the R operator is simply a functional application, i.e., 
(This would of course assume that a variable ranging over time points was 
lambda abstracted within 9.) 
However, in order to  make various needed discriminations in our 
semantic rules, we prefer to take a different tack: in addition to includ- 
ing time in the object language, we will also include it in our 
metalanguage. 
That is to  say, time is not only another sort or type within the object 
language, but will also figure as an additional dimension on which the 
denotation depends in the metalanguage. Or ,  one may regard it as 
though there were actually two times involved: those referred to within 
the expression, and the time of the expression itself. 
In order to make the separation clear, we will use variables beginning 
with "t" in the object language to  stand for times. In the metalanguage 
we will indicate times as "j". (This latter maintains a notational conven- 
tion begun by Montague.) Thus, where we formerly wrote DenMag@, we will 
now write DenMejegiP. The semantic rule for R is therefore as follows: 
Sem. For a a term of type t ,  and 9 E ME,, DenMjSBR(a)Q = True iff 
for some j ' ,  j' = a and j' < j, DenMsj.,g(9) = True. 
Some explanation might be in order. Here, and henceforth, j will be 
the time with the expression in question is interpreted, i.e., when the 
denotation is evaluated (in computer terms, the time when the database 
is queried). R(a)iP is true at  this time if and only if 9 is true a t  some ear- 
lier time, a. Note that if a refers to some future time, i.e., a > j, then the 
denotation of the expression R(a)Q remains undefined by this semantic 
rule. 
Several further realization operators will prove useful. They are 
defined as follows. For a time span a,  and a formula @: 
Reading: iP is "realized throughout" time span a .  Note: since time spans 
were defined as characteristic functions, the expression "a(t)" evaluates 
True i! time point t is in a .  
Readmg: @ is "realized during" time span a ,  i .e . ,  it is realized throughout 
some sub-interval of a. 
For a time point, 7, and a formula @, 
RB(7)@ ::= ] p  [p I: & RD(Span(y,p))@] 
The above realization operators are "state oriented," i.e., they indi- 
cate somethmg to be true a t  a particular point or span of time. 
Another construct will allow us to describe change. One could 
describe change using the above constructs, e.g., 
where to and t, are succeeding moments in time. However, often we will 
want to describe changes generically, without reference to the specific 
time when it occurred. For ths we adopt a notation of von Wright ( 1965), 
where 
is read "a and then p." Here in CANDID, this will be defined essentially as 
a lambda abstraction on the preceding formula: 
( a  T p) ::= Ato I t ,  NEXT(to,tl) & a( to)  & p(tl) .  
I t  will be remembered that the set E was defined as consisting of 
physical objects existing in the past or present. However, it is often 
necessary to indicate just when a particular object is in exists. For that 
we need to adopt the predicate: 
EXISTS (k) . 
With the aid of the preceding realization operators, we can indicate 
whether an object existed at  a particular time, e.g., 
indicates that John existed throughout the year 1980 (he may also have 
existed at  other times as well). Birth and death are designated respec- 
tively as 
One may then question how this differs from the existential quantif- 
ier, 2 which is sometimes read as "there exists." Rescher and Urquhart 
(1971) offer the interpretation that the predicate, EXISTS, is one of "tem- 
poral existence." In our case this is merely a question of convenient 
translations of the two symbols. The existential quantifier refers to the 
inclusion of some individual in the model. The existence predicate, how- 
ever, refers to relationship between t b s  individual and points or spans of 
time. 
1 4 .  POSSIBLF: WORLDS. INTENSIONS 
In the last section, we generalized the notion of denotation to depend 
not only on the model M = <D, C ,  N,  T, F> and an assignment of values to 
variables, g, but also on the location of the expression in a time dimen- 
sion. 
In this section we generalize one final time on the notion of denota- 
tion, making it in addition dependent on its location in a so-called possible 
w w l d .  This concept has had a rich and not uncontroversial recent h s -  
tory in logic, philosophy and linguistics. The early Wittgenstein (1921) 
saw this as the key to the formalization of natural languages (later in life, 
after an immense following was pursuing h s  earlier work, he reversed this 
clain, (Wittgenstein 1953)). 
Kripke (1963) used the concept of possible world to create a formal 
semantics for modal logic. On the one hand, mathematical logicians, e.g.,  
Chang and Keisler (1973), Kalish e t  al. (19BO), equate the notion with a 
model for a formal language (a t  least a t  the level of first order 
languages). On the other hand, linguists and philosophers, e.g., Cresswell 
(1973), Rescher (1975), seem to regard possible worlds more broadly, as a 
sort of gedanken experiments, not limited by the vocabulary of the 
language. 
Our usage of possible worlds here will be more on the mathematical 
side, i.e., that a possible world is an alternative model. 
Following Montague's notation, the collection of possible worlds will 
be designated by the set  I ,  whose individuals are written as i, i', etc. in the 
metalanguage. Apart from the model M and assignment g, the denotation 
of an  expression therefore depends on its location in a possible world, i, 
and a time j. The pair <i,j> is called an indez .  
In our last formal summary, i.e., of the language &, the model con- 
sisted of the domain, D of individual entities, and F an interpretation 
function on D interpreting the predicate and operation constants as rela- 
tions and functions on D. Since then we added the additional sets C 
(character strings), N (numbers) and T (times) to  the model. 
Our use of character strings and numbers was essentially an alterna- 
tive to introducing more predicate names, e.g., Height(x) = 20 might be 
viewed as an abbreviation of HEIGHT-IS-20(x), and Last-Name(x) = 
"SMITH" might abbreviate LAST-NAME-SMITH(x). 
rime, on the other hand, introduced a dimension on which the truth 
value denotations of an expression depended. I.e., for an expression i P ,  
DenMjg@ = True or False depending, inter alia, on the time j. Here M = 
<D, C, N, T, F>. The only one of these sets that varies with time is D, i.e., 
the set of individuals existing a t  or before time j. Correspondingly, the 
interpretation function, F, will also depend on the time, j,  since while F 
includes relations in all the sets, the relations involving D will vary. 
Thus, i t  is essentially only the pair <D,F> that  vary with j. Here the 
changes in <D,F> as j increases might be viewed as all "due to natural 
causes," e.g., individuals are born and die, and single and sets of individu- 
als change their properties. 
The aspects of the model that vary between different possible worlds 
are also confined to the pair <D,F>. Here, however, the differences in 
<D,F> between one possible world and another are arbitrary. (There is no 
notion of adjacency between possible worlds as there is with times, since 
worlds are not ordered under "<", hence there is no basis for graduating 
differences.) Indeed, which we will continue to discuss the pair <D,F> as 
depending on a possible world i, though in an arbitrary way, in fact a pos- 
sible world is equivalent  to some arbitrarily chosen domain and interpre- 
tation function, i.e., some <D1,F'>. 
Thus, possible worlds and points in time determine a coordinate sys- 
tem on which <D,F> depends. Graphically, we might represent this for 
two possible worlds, il and i2, and three times, j l ,  j2, jJ, as follows: 
The purpose, for Montague, of this device is to explicitly represent 
what philosophers call the in tension (spelled with an "s") of an expres- 
sion. (Thus Montague's calculus is called "Intensional Logic"). 
Very briefly, it has long been recognized that the usual concept of 
denotation is insufficient to capture what we consider its complete mean- 
ing. (In informal usage, this residual part of meaning is often called its 
connotation.  Intension and extension, as used here, are more t e c h c a l  
terms corresponding to connotation and denotation, respectively.) Frege 
(1893) captured the problem succinctly in his famous example of Morning 
Star and Evening Star: the two phrases denote the same thing, but they 
have somewhat different uses, hence different connotations or intensions. 
More to the point of our interests is the problem of so called opaque 
contez ts .  In English these appear with such verbs as "believe,," "think," 
''imagine," etc.  followed by the relative pronoun "that." (In Latin based 
languages these are the class of subjunctive constructions.) Consider the 
following example. 
Let P = "the world is flat" 
Q = "the moon is made of green cheese" 
Suppose that an individual, John, believes P, i.e., 
The problem is that t h s  would lead us to infer 
since A and B denote the same thing, namely False. However, we intui- 
tively find it unacceptable to infer that if someone believes one false 
thlng, he/she then believes every false thing. 
As relates to the applications of CANDID, thls same problem of 
opaque contexts arises in all types of commercial and financial contracts: 
if someone contracts to do some thing, that they are then obligated to do 
eve r y  thing. 
The mechanism that Montague proposes to avoid t h s  is his intension 
operator,  A. 
Effectively, this operates as an implicit lambda abstraction on 
indices (possible world, point in time pairs). Thus for instance if cP E ME,, 
A@ refers to the set of tuples of the form <<i,j>,v>, i.e., evaluating the 
proposition @ a t  every index. Cresswell (1973:23-24) offers an intuitive 
motivation of what this provides 
If we thlnk for a moment of the job a proposition has to do we 
see that it  must be something which can be true or false, not 
only in the actual world but in each possible world. Suppose for 
the moment that  we could "show" a person all possible worlds in 
turn. Thls is of course impossible, but try to imagine it anyway. 
We want to know whether two people are thinking of the same 
proposition. So we ask them, as we show them each (complete) 
possible world. "Would the proposition you are thinking of be 
true if that was the way thmgs were?" If their answers agree for 
every possible world there is a t  least the temptation to  suppose 
that they have the same proposition in mind. Or to  put it 
another way, if the set of worlds to which A says "yes" is the 
same as the set of worlds to which B says "yes" we can say that  
A and B have the same proposition in mind. So why not simply 
identify the proposition with the set  of worlds in question? As a 
first approximation therefore we shall say that a proposition is a 
set  of possible worlds. 
Thus, with reference to our previous example, we would avoid the 
erroneous substitution by writing 
BELI EXE s ( JO hn, A ~ )  
Since there are conceivable possible worlds in which P is true and Q false, 
or vice versa, A ~ #  A ~ ,  even though both P and Q are false in the actual 
world. 
The converse of the intension operator is written "V"; i .e.,  V@ is the 
application of the intension iP to  the actual world. Hence, 
Ths latter notation will however be of lesser importance for our applica- 
tions. 
As seen in the above discussion, intension and extension are inter- 
related concepts. Further, extension corresponds to what we have here- 
tofore called denotation. In keeping with the terminology of Montague 
(and Dowty), we will switch to the abbreviation "Ext" (for extension) 
rather than "Den" in our semantic rules. Correspondingly, the new abbre- 
viation, "Int" (for intension) will be introduced. 
Let us now summarize the formal language as it stands thus far. 
I-K SUM- OF THE LANGUAGE IL 
Syntax of IL 
Corresponding to each type a, the intension of that type will be a new 
type, written <s,a> (where s stands for "sense"-Fregels original term for 
"intension," which was introduced by Carnap.) The "s" may be read as an 
abbreviation for the <i,j>. Hence <s,a> abbreviates <<i,j>,a>. The set of 
types (i.e., Type) is de fined recursively as follows: 
e is a type 
c is a type 
n is a type 
t is a type 
if a and b are any types, then <a,b> is a type 
if a is any type, then <s,a> is a type. 
The basic expressions of IL consist of: 
1) tor each type a ,  the se t  of constant of type a, denoted Con,. 
(Names for particular constants follow the conventions 
described earlier.) 
2) for each type a ,  the se t  of variables of type a, denoted Var,. 
(Names for variables are as before.) 
3) te?ms of type a, denoted Term,, defined recursively as follows: 
- if a E Con, then a E Term,. 
- if a E Var, then a E Term, 
- if P2, . . . ,/In a r e  terms of types xl  ,..., x, respectively and Q 
is an  operation of type <xl ,..., <x,,a>> then iP(@,, . . . , p n )  E 
Term,. 
- if p E Var, and iP E ME<,,t,, whose only unbound variable is 
p, then ~piP E Term,. 
The set  of meaningful expressions of type a,  denoted ME,, is defined 
re,cursively as follows: 
1. Every term of type a is in ME,. 
2. If a E and @ E ME,, then a(p)  E MEb. 
3. If a E ME, and p is a variable of type b, then hpa E MEcb,,,. 
4. If a and @ are  both in ME,, then [a=@] E ME,. 
5. If iP E and p E Var, then L p iP E ME,. 
6-10. If @ and + are in ME,, then so are 
6. [-@I 
7 .  [@ & +I 
8.  [@ v+] 
0. [@ 3 +] 
lo.  [ @  - +I 
11-12. If @ E ME, and p is a variable (of any type) then 
11. w p @  €ME, 
12. 3p@ E ME, 
13. If p E Vart and @ E ME, then R p @ E ME, 
14. If @ and + are inME,, then @ T +  E ME, 
15. If @ E ME, then"@] E ME,,,,> 
16. If @ E ME<,,,> thenv@ E ME,. 
Semantics of IL 
A model for IL is the ordered tuple M = <D, C ,  N. T, W, F> where D, C, 
N ,  T and W are non-empty sets, that assigns an  appropriate denotation to 
each (non-logical) constant of IL relative to each pair <i,j>, for i E W and j 
E T. (Thus "F(<i,j>,a) = y" asserts that the denotation of the constant cx 
in the possible world i at time j is the object 7 . )  
The set of possibLe denotations of type a ,  written D,, is define as fol- 
lows (where a and b are any types): 
D, = D 
D, = C 
D, = N 
Dt = T 
Dv = [True, False] 
D<a.b> = DbDa 
D<, ,>  = D , ~  (where WXT is the set of all world, time point pairs, i.e., 
the set  of all indices <i,j>). 
Semantic Rules 
The semantic rules of IL define recursively for any expression a,  the 
ez tens ion  of a with respect to model N,  i E W, j E T and value assignment 
g, written E ~ t ~ , ~ , j , ~ ( a )  as follows: 
1. If a is a non-logical constant then E ~ t ~ , j , ~ , ~ ( a )  = F ) (<i,j>), (i.e., 
the extension of a at <i,j> is simply the result of applying the 
intension of a,  which is supplied by F, to <i,j>). 
2. If a is a variable, then E ~ t ~ j , ~ , ~ ( a )  = g a) 
3. If a E ME, and p is a variable of type b, then ExtM,j,jag (Apa) is 
that function h with domain Db such that for any object x in that 
domain, h(x) = Extu,i,j,g.(a), where g'  is that value assignment 
exactly like g with the possible difference that g'(p) is the object 
X. 
4. If a E MEoeb> and @ E ME,, then E~t~.~,~,g(a)(E~t~,~,~,g(@)) (i .e.  the 
result of applying the function E ~ t ~ j , ~ , ~ ( a )  to the argument 
Exty.i.j.g(@)) . 
If a and p are in ME,, then E ~ t ~ , ~ . ~ , ~ ( a = p )  is True if and only if 
E~ t~ ,~ . j , , ( a )  is the same as E ~ t ~ , ~ j g ( p ) .  
If Q E MEt, then E X ~ ~ , ~ ~ , ~ ( " Q )  is True if and only if E ~ t ~ ~ , j , ~ ( @ )  is 
False, and ExtM j,j,g(NQ) is False otherwise. 
If Q and \k are in ME,, then E x t ~ ~ , ~ , ~ [ @  & \k] is True if and only if 
both E X ~ ~ , J , ~ , ~ ( Q )  and E ~ t ~ , , , ~ ~ ( \ k )  are True. 
 EX^^,^,^,,[@ V +] is True if and only if either E ~ t ~ , ~ , j , ~ [ @ ]  is True or 
E ~ t ~ , ~ , ~ , , [ \ k ]  is True. E X ~ ~ , ~ , ~ . ~ [ Q  --, +] is True if and only if either 
 EX^^,^,^,,[@] is False or  EX^^^,^.^[+] it True. 
E X ~ ~ , ~ , ~ . , [ Q  - \k] is True if and only if either both E X ~ ~ , ~ , ~ , , [ Q ]  and 
E ~ t ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ [ \ k ]  are both True or are both False. 
If Q E ME, and p is a variable of type e ,  then E ~ t ~ , ~ , j , ~  ( ~ p 9 )  is 
True if and only if Extyjjg(Q) is True for all g' exactly like g 
except possibly for the value assigned to p. 
If Q E ME, and p is a variable, then E ~ t ~ , ~ j , ~ ( 2 p Q )  is True if and 
only if E x ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ , ( ~ P )  is True for some value assignment g' exactly 
like g except for the value assigned to p.  
For a a term of type t ,  and @ E ME,, Extueij,,(R a Q) = True iff for 
some j ' ,  j '=a and j l < j ,  E X ~ ~ . ~ . ~ , , ( ~ P )  = True. 
For Q and \k in M E , ,  ExtM,jjd(Q T \k) = True iff E x ~ ~ . ~ , ~ ~ . ~ ( Q )  = True 
and E~t~j ,~m-,~(\k)  = True for some j' and j" such that j' immedi- 
ately precedes j". 
If a E ME, , then E ~ t ~ , j , ~ , ~ ( % )  is that function h with domain WXT 
such that for all <i',j'> in WXT, h(<i',j '>) is E ~ t ~ , ~ ~ * ~ ( a ) .  
16. If a E ME ,,, then E ~ t ~ , ~ . ~ . ~ ( ~ a )  is E ~ t , ~ , ~ . , ( a )  (< , i , j>)  (i.e., the 
result of applying the function ExtMaijBg ( a )  to the argument 
<i,j>). 
Additional Primitive and Defined Predicates and Operations 
For lhnain C (character strings) 
None 
For h a i n  N (numbers) 
1, type: <n,<n,v>> 
[ a  < 81 (primitive) 
[a s 81 ::= [a < /?I V [a = /?I 
[a > 81 ::= "[a s 81 
[a283 ::= [a>B]V[a =PI 
[a#8]::= "[a=/?] 
2, type: <n,<n,n>> 
[a + 81 (primitive) 
[a - 81 (primitive) 
[a * 81 (primitive) 
[a / 81 (primitive) 
[ a  *+ 81 (primitive) 
For Domain T (times) 
1. type: <t ,<t ,v>> 
<, 4, >, 2, # (defined as for numbers,) 
NEXT(a,/3) ::= a</3 & 'dt[[T#a & [ t  # /3] --, "[a < t < /3]] 
2, type: <t ,<t<t ,v>> 
Span ::= Ax Ay Az [z >= x & z s  y] 
3, type: <<t,v>,t> 
Beg : : = Ax ~y 2 z [x = Span(y, t)] 
End ::= Ax LZ J y  [x = Span(y,z)] 
4. type: <<t,v><<t,v>,v> 
PT ::= Ax Xy [ ~ e g ( x )  r Beg(y) & End(x) s End(y)] 
5, type: <n,<n,<n,<t ,v>>>> 
Date (a$, 7)  (primitive) 
6. type: <n,<n,<t,v>> 
7, type: <n,<t ,v>> 
Yr(a) (primitive) 
8, type: <<t,v>,<<t,v>,n>> 
Dur(a,/3) (primitive) 
9, type: <t,v> 
Day (primitive) 
10, type: <<t,v>,<v,v>> 
RT(a)@ ::= V t  a ( t )  --, R(t) @ 
RD(a) cP ::= 3 p PT(p,a) & RT(p) 
11. type: <<t,<v,v>> 
RB(Y) 9 ::= 3~ [P Y & RD(Span(y,p))@] 
I-L. ACI'ION 
Earlier, the connective T, a construct due to  von Wright (1965), was 
introduced in order to describe generic changes. We now follow von 
Wright's development further to obtain a description of actions. 
Von Wright introduces another connective, I ,  with a syntax like that  
of T, i.e., 
Syn. If 9 and 9 are inME,, then 9 I 9 E M E ,  
This connective has the reading "instead of." Its effect is that ,  due t o  the 
intercession of some agent, 9 is true instead of 9 being true. 
As von Wright points out, I serves as to coordinate two possible 
worlds. 
Interpreting von Wright's sense for I in the Montague framework as 
we have developed it so far we have: 
Sem. For 9 and 9 in ME,, then E ~ t ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ( 9  = True iff  EX^^,^,^,,(@) = 
True and E ~ t ~ , ~ , , ~ , ~ ( 9 )  = True for some i '  just like i except 
that i' lacks the interference of some agent. 
We extend von Wright's notation slightly by adding a place in the con- 
nection specifying the agent. Thus, 
Syn'. If 9 and 9 are  in ME, and a is a term of type e ,  then [ 9  Ia 91 
E ME,,. 
The corresponding semantic rule is as follows: 
Sem'. For iP and + in ME,, and a a term of type e, then E X ~ ~ , ~ , ~ ~ [ ~ P  
Ia +] = True iff E ~ t ~ , ~ , j , ~ ( i P )  = True and E~ t~ ,~p , j ,~ ( 'P )  = True for 
some i' just like i except that i' lacks the interference of 
agent a. 
Ths concept of "interference" is admittedly, rather uncomfortable. 
If we compare the models <D, F> and <Dl, F'> of i and i' respectively, 
what is different about them? Precisely that iP is true in the hrst, and + 
is true in the second. This .is the interference. 
The I connective combines with T to form what von Wright calls "TI 
expressions." I t  is these expressions which are used to express actions, 
i.e., 
is read: "a is true and then B is true instead of y due to the interference 
of p." 
For instance, if the action is for John to open a window, we would 
have 
i.e., the window was closed and then i t  was open instead of remaining 
closed due to the interference of John. 
I-M. M ODALS, DEONTI C OPERATORS 
Montague's Intentional Logic includes the modal operators o and a, 
for possibility and necessity, respectively, by means of the following syn- 
tactic and semantic rules. 
Syn. 1. If 9 E ME,, then OiP E M E , .  
Syn. 2. If 9 E ME,, t h e n u 9  E ME,. 
Sem. 1. For 9& E ME, 
E x ~ ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ( o ~ )  = True iff E x ~ ~ , ~ ~ . ~ ~ . ~ ( ~ P )  = True for some i' in W 
and some j' in T. 
Sem.2. For iP E ME, 
= True iff E X ~ ~ , ~ . , ~ , ~ ~ P  = True for all i' in W and all 
j' in T. 
Thus 0 9  indicates that iP is possibly true, i.e., it is true in some pos- 
sible world at some time. Correspondingly niP indicates iP to be neces- 
sarily true, i.e., true in all possible worlds at all times. 
Either one of these rules could have been omitted, recognizing that 
the two concepts are inter-definable, i.e., 
(Ths follows from the inter definability of the quantifiers Wand 3, implicit 
in the semantic interpretation of these operators.) 
Von Wright points out that this is only one version of necessity (possi- 
bility), what he calls logical necessity (possibility). That is, if 0 9 ,  then Q 
is true by virtue of the interaction of the truth assignments of its compo- 
site formulae, independent of what these formulae denote i .e . ,  Q is true 
in all possible models. Alternative terminology is that Q is a tautology or 
that Q is analytically true. 
Another version of necessity (possibility) is what von Wright calls 
naturd necessity (possibility). We write this as 
and 
If nNQ is true, then Q is true in all worlds and a t  all times "because of the 
way the world operates." Natural necessity is stronger than logical neces- 
sity. For instance, "if x is a human, then x is warm blooded" is a natural 
necessity, though not a logical one. 
In order to portray natural necessity or possibility in our semantic 
framework, we would need to qualify certain possible worlds as being 
"natural," i.e., conforming to the laws of nature. Call this the set WN such 
that WN s W. The syntactic and semantic rules would therefore be as fol- 
lows : 
Syn' 1. If iP E ME, then ON@ E ME,. 
Syn'2. If Q E ME, then pN9 E ME,. 
Sem'l .  For 19 E ME,, E x ~ ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ( o ~ @ )  = True i f f  E ~ t ~ , ~ , ~ ~ , ~ 1 9  = True for 
some i' E WN and some j '  E T. 
Sem'2. For 19 E ME,, E ~ t p , ~ , j . ~ ~ ~ @  = True iff E X ~ ~ , J . , ~ ~ ~ ( @ )  = True for 
all i ' E WN and all j' E T. 
The logical duality of these concepts again holds, i.e., 
oNiP ::= *oNN19. 
Von Wright extends this one step further to address the concepts of 
permission and obligation, which he calls the deontic modalities. We will 
abbreviate these as 
OD@ for @ is permitted 
and 
oDiP for 19 is obligatory. 
(Von Wright uses the notation P and 0 here, but we reserve that for later 
uses.) 
To describe t h s  in our semantic framework, we need to  further qual- 
ify certain possible worlds as being legitimate within a general e thca l  or 
legal code. (Given that there are numerous such codes, e.g., for different 
countries, there are correspondingly different definitions of permission 
and obligation. We ignore this aspect for present purposes.) 
Let me denote the set of deontically permissible worlds as WD, where 
The syntactic and semantic rules are of similar form: 
Syn"1. If 9 E ME, then OD@ E ME, 
Syn"2. If 9 E ME, then nD9 E ME,. 
Sem"1. For 9 E ME, then E x ~ ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ( o ~ ~ )  = True iff  EX^^,^,,^,^(@) = 
True for some i' E WD and some j' E T. 
Sem"2. For 9 E ME, then E ~ t ~ , ~ , ~ , g ( 0 ~ 9  = True iff E ~ t ~ ~ o , ~ * , ~ ( 9 )  = 
True for all i' E WD and all j' E T. 
Once again, these are logical duals: 
That is, if somethng is obligatory, it is not permissible not to do it. Con- 
trariwise, if something is permitted, it is not obligatory not to do it. 
Prohibition, i.e., that something is forbidden, is a deontic impossibility, 
i.e., the negation of permissibility: 
says it is not permitted (forbidden) to do 9. 
It is often argued that "ought" implies "can" i .e . ,  that if something is 
obligatory then it should be naturally possible. This would be reflected in 
the assumption: 
wD r wN r w. 
The deontic modalities differ from the other in that they generally 
apply only to actions. Ths entails that the formula 9 be a TI expression. 
We would therefore write 
to indicate that p is permitted to bring about p (from the previous state 
a, instead of allowing y to occur), and 
D D ~ T [ P I P Y I  
to indicate that p is obliged to bring about 8. 
Note on Contingent Obligations, Permissions 
A contingent obligation (permission) is where an action 9 is obliga- 
tory (permitted) if % occurs. Considering first the case of contingent 
obligation, there seems to be two possible representations: 
a) ~ ~ [ % - + @ ] ( i t i s o b l i g a t o r y t h a t i f % t h e n i P )  
b) \k --, OD @ (if \k then it is obligatory to 9). 
The English reading in these two cases does little to help choose between 
them-both readings seem adequate. 
However, if we e x a ~ i n e  the semantic interpretations in both cases 
there is an important difference. We have 
Sem, E ~ t ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ n ~ [ \ k  91 = True iff - 9) = True for all i' E 
WD and j' E T. 
Semb  EX^^,^,^,^ \k -+ nDiP = True iff action E ~ t ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ( ' k )  = False or 
Ex ~~ ,~ . ,~ . , , ( ~P )  = True for all i' E WD and j' E T. 
In case a, \k -. iP must be true a t  all indices involving permissible 
worlds (i.e., elements of WD). In case b, if \k is t rue at  the current  index, 
then iP must be true a t  all indices involving permissible worlds. The point 
is that  in the second case, + and iP do not necessarily apply to the same 
possible world. Thus if + were not true a t  the current index but were true 
a t  some other index involving a permissible world, iP would not necessarily 
hold a t  t h s  other index. 
This problem is however avoided in case a, and is thus the preferred 
method of representing contingent obligation. Analogous arguments hold 
in the case of contingent permission. 
Contractual Obligation and Permission 
The concepts of obligation and permission discussed thus far pertain 
to  the structure of a general ethical or  legal code. In the case of con- 
tracts  we are concerned with obligation and permission a t  a more specific 
level-e.g., x is obliged t o  y to do iP or x is permitted by y to do iP.  
Our view here is that these specific obligations and permissions 
depend on protection under the general legal system in force. We regard 
this protection to  be in the form of the possibility of taking legal action if 
the terms of the contract are  violated. We abbreviate party x talung legal 
action against party y as LA(x,y). 
Thus, our interpretation of x's obligation to y to do @ is that y is per- 
mitted to take legal action against x if @ does not occur. 
We abbreviate this as follows: 
The symbol "O(x,y)@" will be read "x has the obligation to y to  see to it 
that @." Usually, x will be an agent of an action contained in @, though 
this is not required. For instance, @ might be performed by someone else 
sub-contracted by x. 
The concept of contractual permission is slightly less direct than for 
contractual obligation. We will use the notation 
to indicate that "x permits y to bring about @." We begin with the obser- 
vation that this generally presupposes that y would otherwise be proh-  
bited from doing (bringing about) @ which is to say that x would be per- 
mitted legal action against y if y did @. 
Thus, by granting permission to y to do @, x foregoes this right to 
take legal action. In symbolic form this is summarized as follows: 
Reading: that x permits y to  do @ is defined as that it is not permitted for 
x to take legal action against y if @. 
In the preceding section we saw that the various forms of modal 
operators, including the deontic modals, were logical duals of one 
another. This is also the case with contractual obligation and permission 
as we have defined it--however, with one interesting difference: the order 
of the agent and recipient places is reversed in the dual form. Thus, 
P(xIY)@ ::= "O(y,x) "9 
::= "[OD "(-9 * LA(x,y)] 
::= "[OD 9 * ~ ( X , Y ) ]  
Reading: x permits y to iP is defined that, y is not obligated to x not to 9 .  
The subsequent substitutions lead to the definition of contractual permis- 
sion given previously. 
One additional aspect needs to be considered. In the contracts dis- 
cussed so far, the enforcement of the contract was an implicit recourse 
to legal action. However, in certain contracts t h s  enforcement is made 
explicit in the form of a penalty clause indicating some other action to be 
taken. We will indicate such penalty clauses by adding an additional place 
in the contractual obligation and permission operators, separated by a 
' I  / I 1 .  + Thus 
The previous syntax is thus a special case of t h s ,  where 4' = LA(y,x): 
While explicit penalty clauses are fairly common in the case of contrac- 
tual obligation, they are  rare for contractual permission. Nevertheless, 
for the  sake of completeness and symmetry, we offer the following defini- 
Note: von Wright also uses a slash notation resembhg this, but with a different interpreta- 
tion. 
Letting + be LA(x,y), the earlier definition follows as a special case: 
I-N. SUMMARY OF THE LANGUAGE CANDID 
Syntax of CANDID 
Corresponding to each type a,  the intension of that type will be writ- 
ten <s,a>. The set  of types (i.e., Type) is defined recursively as follows: 
e is a type 
c is a type 
n is a type 
t is a type 
if a and b are any types, then <a,b> is a type 
if a is any type, then <s,a> is a type. 
The basic expressions of CANDID consist of: 
1) for each type a, the set  of cons tan t s  of t y p e  a ,  denoted Con,. 
(Names for particular constants follow the conventions 
described earlier.) 
2) for each type a, the set  of var iab les  of t y p e  a, denoted Var,. 
(Names for variables are as before.) 
3) twms 01 type a, denoted Term,, defined recursively as follows: 
- if a E Con, then a E Term,. 
- if a E Var, then a E Term, 
- if &, . . . ,Bn are terms of types xl , . . . ,  x, respectively and iP 
is an operation of type <x ,,..., <x,,a>> then i P ( @ , ,  . . . ,/3, E 
Term,. 
- if p E Var, and @ E MEcaaD, whose only unbound variable is 
p, then LU@ E Term,. 
F o r m a t i a  N e s  of CANDID 
The set of meaningful expressions of type a, denoted ME,, is defined 
recursively as follows: 
1. Every term of type a is in ME,. 
2. If a E MEcasb> and E ME,, then a(B) E MEb. 
3. If a E ME, and p i s  a variable of type b ,  then Aua E MEcb,,>. 
4. If a and B are both in ME,, then [a=B] E ME,. 
5. If Q E MEcant> and p E Var, then i p @ E ME,. 
6-10. If Q and 9 are in ME,, then so are 
6. ["a] 
7. [Q & $1 
8. [Q v+] 
9. [@ --, +] 
l o .  [ @  - *I 
11-12. If @ E ME, and 1 is a variable (of any type) then 
11. t/p@ EME, 
12. 31 @ E MEv 
13. If p E Vart and @ E ME, then R p @ E ME, 
14. If @ and * are in ME,, then @ T * E ME, 
15. If @ E ME, thenA@ E ME,,.,, 
16. If @ E ME<,,,> thenv@ E ME,. 
17. If @ and + are in ME, and a is a term of type e, then [@ Ia 4'1 
E ME,. 
18,19. If @ E ME, then 
IS. OD@ E ME, 
19. nD@ E ME,, 
Semantics of CANDID 
A model for CANDID is the ordered tuple M = <D, C, N. T, W, F> where 
D, C, N ,  T and W are non-empty sets, that assigns an appropriate denota- 
tion to each (non-logical) constant of CANDID relative to each pair <i,j>, 
for i E W and j E T. (Thus "F(<i,j>,a) = y" asserts that the denotation of 
the constant a in the possible world i at time j is the object y.) 
The set of possible denotations of type a is defined as follows (where a 
and b are any types): 
D, = D 
D, = C 
Dn = N 
D, = T 
D, = tTrue, False] 
Dc&a> = D ~ D .  
D<,,> = Dam (where WXT is the set of all world, time point pairs, i .e.,  
the set of all indices <i,j>. 
Semantic Rules 
The semantic rules of CANDID define recursively for any expression 
a, the extension of a with respect to model N, i E W, j E T and value 
assignment g, written E ~ t ~ , , , ~ , ~ ( a )  as follows: 
1. If a is a non-logical constant then E ~ t ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ( a )  = F(a) (<i,j>), (i.e.,  
the extension of a at <i,j> is simply the result of applying the 
intension of a ,  which is supplied by F, to <i,j>). 
2. If a is a variable, then E ~ t ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ( a )  = g(a) 
3 If a E ME, and p is a variable of type b, then (Aua) is 
that function h with domain Db such that for any object x in that 
domain, h(x) = E x ~ ~ , ~ , ~ ~ ~ ( U . ) ,  where g' is that value assignment 
exactly like g with the possible difference that gl(p) is the object 
X. 
4. If a E MEcavb> and E ME,, then E~t~,~,~,~(a)(Ext~,~,~,g(@)) ( i .e . ,  the 
result of applying the function E ~ t ~ . ~ , ~ , ~ ( a )  to the argument 
Ext~.i.j.g(P)). 
5. If a and B are in ME,, then ExtMsjjo(a=/3) is True if and only if 
E ~ t ~ , ~ ~ j , ~ ( a )  is the same as E ~ t ~ j , ~ . ~ ( / 3 ) .  
6. If @ E MEt, then E ~ t ~ , ~ , j , g ( ~ 9 )  is True if and only if E ~ t ~ , ~ , j . ~ ( 9  is 
False, and E ~ t ~ ~ , j , ~ ( ' " 9 )  is False otherwise. 
7 .  If O and + are in ME,, then E x ~ ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ [ O  & $1 is True if and only if 
both E ~ t ~ , ~ , j , g ( @ )  and E ~ t ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ( \ k )  are True. 
8. E ~ t ~ . ~ , j . ~ [ @  V \k] is True if and only if either E ~ t ~ , , , ~ , ~ [ 9 ]  is True or 
E~t~ , j . j .~ [ \k]  is True. ExtMdiajSg[iP - $1 is True if and only if either 
E X ~ ~ , ~ , ~ . ~ [ O ]  is False or E ~ t ~ , ~ , j , ~ [ + ]  it True.
10. E ~ t ~ , ~ , j , ~ [ @  - +] is True if and only if either both  EX^^,^,^,^[@] and 
EXtm,j,jmg[+] are both True or are both False. 
11. If O E ME, and p is a variable of type e,  then E ~ t ~ , j , j , ~  (Vp@) is 
True if and only if ExtMjaje(iP) is True for all g'  exactly like g 
except possibly for the value assigned to p. 
12. If 9 E ME, and ,u is a variable, then E ~ t ~ ~ ~ , ~ ( l p i P )  is True if and 
only if E ~ t ~ , j , ~ , ~ . ( 9 )  is True for some value assignment g' exactly 
like g except for the value assigned to p. 
13. For a a term of type t ,  and 9 E M E , ,  E ~ t ~ , j , j , ~ ( R  a 9) = True iff for 
some j ', j '+a and j '<j, E ~ t ~ , j . ~ , , ~ ( @ )  = True. 
14. For 9 and \k in M E , ,  ExtM . , jg($ T +) = True iff Extld . . jv,g(9) = True 
and ExtMjj.ng(+) = True for some j' and j" such that j' immedi- 
ately precedes j". 
15. If a E ME,, then E ~ t ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ( ' k t )  is that function h with domain WXT 
such that for all <i1,j '> in WXT, h(<il,j '>) is E ~ t ~ ~ . ~ , , ~ ( a ) .  
16. If a E ME ,,,,,, then E ~ t ~ , ~ , ~ . ~ ( ' ' a )  is E ~ t ~ , ~ , ~ . , ( a )  (<,i,j>) (i.e., the 
result of applying the function  EX^^,^,^,^ (a) to the argument 
<i,j>). 
17. For iP and + in ME, and a a term of type e, then E x ~ ~ , ~ , ~ . ~ [ ~ P  I a  +] 
= True iff ExtMj4j,g(iP) = True and  EX^^.^,^,,(+) = True for some i '  
just like i except that i' lacks the interference of agent a .  
18. For iP E ME, then E x ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ ( o ~ ~ J )  = True iff E X ~ ~ , ~ , ~ . , , ( ~ P )  = True for 
some i '  E WD and some j' E T. 
19. For iP E ME,, then = True iff E~t~,~, ,~ ' ,g( iP)  = True for 
all i' E WD and all j' E T. 
Additional Primitive and Defined Predicates and Operations 
For hmain C (character strings) 
None 
For Domain N (numbers) 
1. type: <n,<n,v>> 
[a (81 (primitive) 
[ a s p ] : : =  [a < p ] V [ a = p ]  
[a > 81 ::= 
-[a I 81 
[ a r  p] ::= [a > 81 V [ a  = 81 
[a # p] ::= "[a = p] 
2. type: <n,<n,n>> 
[ a  + 81 (primitive) 
[ a  - 81 (primitive) 
[ a  ' 81 (primitive) 
[ a  / 81 (primitive) 
[ a  ** @I (primitive) 
Fm Domain T (times) 
1. type: <t ,<t ,v>> 
<, s, >, 2, # (defined as for numbers,) 
NEXT(u,@) ::= a<@ & ~ t [ [ T # a  & [t # 81 4 "[a < t < 811 
2. type: <t ,<t<t ,v>> 
Span ::= Ax hy Xz [z >= x & z 6 y] 
3. type: <<t,v>,t> 
Beg ::= Ax ~y 2z [x = Span(y,t)] 
End ::= Ax LZ 2  y [x = Span(y,z)] 
4. type: <<t,v><<t,v>,v> 
PT ::= Ax Ay [Beg(x) 2 Beg(y) & End(x) s End(y)] 
5. type: <n,<n,<n,<t ,v>>>> 
Date(a,@,y) (primitive) 
6. type: <n,<n,<t,v>> 
7 .  type:<n,<t ,v>> 
Yr( a )  (primitive) 
8, type: <<t ,v>,<<t ,v>,n>> 
Dur(a,B) (primitive) 
9. type: <t,v> 
Day (primitive) 
10. type: <<t,v>,<v,v>> 
RT.(a)@ ::= V t  a ( t )  -, R(t) 
RD(a) ::= 3 p PT(p,a) & RT(p) 
11. type: <<t,<v,v>> 
RB(Y) ::= gp [p y & RD(Span(y,p))@] 
12. type: <e ,<e ,v>> 
LA (primitive) 
13. type: <e, <e, <v.v>>> 
14. type: <e,<e,  <v.<v,v>>>> 
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The purpose in this part is to illustrate the use of CANDID to the for- 
mal description of principal actors and objects of economic activity. This 
step contributes to the larger goal of formalizing the legal/accounting 
aspects of commerce that they may be subjected to a system of mechani- 
cal inference. Applications of such a system include ai&ng management 
to interpret internal cost systems, assistance in the management of the 
firms commercial, financial and legal obligations, and the analysis of com- 
mercial and financial regulatory systems. 
The concepts that appear in such applications range from the mun- 
dane and commonplace, e.g., nuts, bolts, to the complex and esoteric, 
e.g., partially allocated costs, sale-leaseback agreements, the U.S. Securi- 
ties and Exchange Commission Regulations. 
The job of a formal language for describing such concepts is to 
render them unambiguous down to a limited set of primitive concepts 
which are consensually understood by all parties using the language. 
A computer system using this language could therefore aid in rectify- 
ing definitional misunderstandings between disagreeing parties. Likewise, 
as an aid to individual decision making, it can explain any of its infer- 
ences in step by step elementary terms. 
A. critical factor, however, is that the language be based on primitive 
concepts that are clearly and unambiguously understood by all its users. 
Subsequent definitions based on these elementary terms can then be as 
intricate as necessary without the danger of magnifying an elementary 
ambiguity. 
A fundamental issue here is the so-called "identification of particu- 
lars," of having consensual recognition and labeling of the individual enti- 
ties described by the language. 
Strawson (1959) argues that the proper basis for such identification 
is the locatability of these entities in a spatial/temporal framework. Thus 
for instance individual people in that they are borne a t  a particular place 
and time, and have continuity in space and time, and have continuity in 
space and time until their deaths. Given sufficient factual data about a 
person's whereabouts throughout time, an arbitrary group of observers 
could presumably agree as to the identification of this individual (e.g., 
whether it were really an actual person, or multiple persons, etc.) 
Phenomena that do not have continuity in space and time are prone 
to much more disagreement of identification. Consider for example 
Beethoven's 9th Symphony. Is there one unique referent to this name or 
many? We may individuate versions of this symphony by its reproduc- 
tions on paper or specific performances by orchestras but in both cases 
we re-cast it into a representation locatable in a space time framework. 
Textual works offer a similar difficulty. A more modern example is a com- 
puter program, for instance SPSS (statistical package for the social sci- 
ences), as an arbitrary example. There have been numerous versions of 
t h s  program and hundreds of computer installations have one of these 
versions. Further, a t  any given installation, more than one copy of the 
program may be executed in the machine's memory a t  a given time. 
Ths problem of individuation becomes especially important when we 
consider not just information objects, like symphonies and computer pro- 
grams, but contractual objects like notes, bonds, stocks. options, 
licenses, insurance policies, etc.  Clearly it is of critical importance for a 
company to  know if it has a certain right or obligation. Indeed it is pre- 
cisely because of thls problem of identification that  signed documents 
play such an  important role in contractual transactions: the signed docu- 
ment represents the agreement in a form locatable in space and time. 
As mentioned in the opening sentence, our goal here is to  formally 
describe the principle actors and objects of economic activity. Our cri- 
terion for formalization will be the unique identification of such entities in 
this spatial /temporal framework. 
If we consider only persons as economic actors and physical objects 
as  economic objects, the problem is trivial: both types of entities are 
locatable in space and time. 
However, another common type of economic entity (a t  least in 
western societies) is a corporation. A corporation is more problematic 
from this perspective since it has no essential physical reality: no one of 
its assets, including its buildings, nor any one of its employees nor any of 
its executives o r  board members nor any one of its stockholders is essen- 
tial to the identification of the corporation. Any one of these may change 
or be  removed from the corporation, and the identity of the corporation 
can still continue. 
The objects of economic activity, i.e., the things that  a re  traded, 
present analogous problems for formal description. Money for instance is 
a key object of exchange. Yet money is no longer uniquely represented 
by physical objects such as coins and bills, but often appears merely as 
magnetic records in bank accounts. These, like computer programs, lose 
the easy location in a unique place at  a given time. 
Information objects, such as recorded music, printed texts and com- 
puter programs were already mentioned as presenting a problem for 
identification. Such objects present an interesting legal problem in that 
they can be "stolen" (copied) without removal of the original. (Our notion 
of theft is basically a physical one.) Computer, communications and pho- 
tocopy technology are bring the characteristics of t h s  type of object to 
prime economic importance. 
One other type of non-physical economic objects was also already 
cited: contractual objects. Signed documents have historically provided 
these types of objects with an easy physical identifiability. However, in 
most concentrated centers of trading in contractual objects, namely 
commodity, bond and stock market exchanges, there is a definite move 
towards automation of records and transactions, so that here to the iden- 
tifiability of such objects becomes problematic. 
Legal Framework 
Concepts of economic actors and objects are defined within a general 
legal framework, whch to a certain extent varies from one country to the 
next. The perspective taken here is an essentially capitalistic one, where 
corporations, independent though perhaps regulated by government, play 
a major economic role. Legal definitions and rules are all taken from 
United States law, the only code where the author has sufficient familiar- 
ity. 
As a reference for the definitions used here, we have made use of Col- 
lege BzLsiness Law. (Rosenberg, R.R.  and Ott, W.G.,  Sahurn's Outline 
Series, McGraw-Hill Co., 1977). T h s  is also suggested as a useful 
elementary-level reference text. 
However, we hope that this starting point not be taken as  a boun- 
dary. The foundation concepts of contractual obligation, permission, etc.  
have their analogues in any society that  has moved beyond a simple bar- 
t e r  system, and it is our belief that  the concepts presented here are  
extendible to other economic systems, whether free market, centrally 
controlled, or some intermediate combination. 
The general legal system we mention is of course established by the  
ruling government which is itself an  important economic actor. However, 
insofar as the  legal system generally reflects a long evolution in com- 
parison to  the shorter time frame of a government's transactions (i.e.,  
the government generally cannot change the law from one transaction to  
the  next), we prefer to separate the  legal code from the government as 
economic actor, and consider the government and its agencies as regu- 
lated by the law as are  other economic actors. 
The assumption of a single legal code confines our attention here to  
transactions covered entirely by that  code, i .e . ,  to  to  domestic transac- 
tions. In Part I general permission and obligation (relative to  an  arbitrary 
set  of laws and norms) was denoted as: 
OD for permission (deontic possibility) 
OD for obligation (deontic necessity) 
Here to indicate our somewhat more restricted assumption to U.S. law, 
we designate this as 
OL for permission under U.S. law 
DL for obligation under U.S. law 
Actually, in the U.S. there are two levels of commercial laws, one a t  the 
state and one a t  the federal level. The scope of the federal laws pertains 
primarily to inter-state commerce. When we want to indicate the opera- 
tion of state law, as distinguished from U.S. federal law, we will use the 
notation: 
*L.X for permission under the law of state x 
O L , X  for obligation under the law of state x 
For instance, 
would indicate +.hat 9 is permitted in the state law of New York. 
Extension of t h s  work to international commerce would employ still 
another legal level: international law. An essential difference at  this 
level--which we avoid for present purposesis  the ultimate source of legal 
enforcement. In domestic transactions, the physical power of the ruling 
government is the ultimate enforcement of the law. 
A t  the international level, lacking a single dominating world govern- 
ment, such transactions are subject to the treaties and agreements esta- 
blished between the nations involved, and the appeal for enforcement is 
correspondingly complicated. 
h e r s h i p  and Possession 
The most fundamental concept of economics, perhaps, is that  of 
(legal) ownership, which is designated by the predicate : 
OWN (x,y) 
meaning that  x, a n  economic actor, o w n s  y, an economic object. The 
essence of this paper is to elaborate the predicates that qualify x and y. 
Here we adopt OWN as a primitive predicate. That is not to  say it 
could not be analyzed further. For instance, there are certain differ- 
ences in the concept of ownership between capitalist and communist 
countries, and to  explicate international commerce one may want to 
describe these differences in terms of more elementary concepts. 
Another relationship between economic actors and objects is that  of 
possession, written 
indicating that  actor x possesses object y. Again, this is a fundamental 
concept which we take as primitive, though its meaning might vary some- 
what in other economic systems. 
Intuitively speaking, ownership constitutes a set of right granted by 
the legal system of an  actor towards an object. Possession on the other 
hand refers to  physical custody. Usually, an  actor possesses what it owns, 
but not always, as in the case of loans and rentals. 
Actually, in t h s  paper, possession has only a minor role. I t  however 
f~gures  more prominently in Par t  111, which discusses representation of 
financial contracts. 
Some Further Definitions and Notation 
In CANDID, predicates indicating a change in state may be defined 
using the connective T. Here, we will suffix the names of predicates so 
defined with the character "!" as a visual aid to reading the expressions. 
Using OWN and POSS, two such change predicates are  defined as follows: 
OCHANGE! (x,y,z) ::= OWN(x,y) T OWN(y,z) 
PCHANGE!(x,y,z) ::= POSS(x,z) T POSS(y,z) 
OCHANGE! indicates a change in ownership of the object z from x t o  y. 
PCHANGE! indicates a change in possession of the object z from x to y. 
Also, in CANDID a concept of action is defined by using so-called TI 
expressions containing the  connectives T and I .  Here, again only as a 
visual aid, we use the suffix "!!" on the names of such predicates. Using 
OWN and POSS, four such action predicates may be defined: 
OGTVE!! (x,y,z) :: = OWN(x,z) T [OWN(y,z) I(x) OWN(x,z)] 
OTAKE!! (x,y,z) ::= OWN(x,z) T [OWN(y.z) I(y) OWN(X,Z)] 
PGTVE!!(x,y,z) ::= POSS(X,Z) T [POSS(y,z) I(x) POSS(x,z)] 
PTAKE!!(x,y,z) ::= POSS(x,z) T [POSS(y,z) I(y) POSS(x,z)] 
In OGTVE!!, x causes a change of ownership of z from x to  y. In OTAKE!!, y 
causes this same change of ownership to  occur. In PGIVE!!, x causes a 
change of possession of z from x to y. In PTAKF,!!, y causes this same 
change to occur. 
II-B. ECONOMIC ACTORS 
Persons. Proprietorships 
The most obvious type of economic actor is individual persons, desig- 
nated as: 
However, in U.S. law, not all persons qualify as  legitimate economic 
actors-minors and the insane are excluded. This more restricted set is 
designated PERSON (legal person), defined as: 
PERSON(x) ::= PERSON(x) & AGE(x,YR) r 18 & SANE(x). 
Personal businesses, owned by a single individual are called proprie- 
twships. In U.S. law they are not distinguished from their owner, hence 
Joint Ownership, Partnerships 
Joint ownership is where one or more parties share equally in the 
ownership of an object. Essentially, the group of owners form a set whch 
as a unit owns the object. For instance, for joint owners x,, ..., x, 
In U.S. law, a partnership is an economic actor consisting of such a 
set of equally participating persons. Hence, 
Private Corporations 
It is a t  t h s  level that the concept of an economic actor becomes p h -  
losophically challenging. A corporation is an artifice of the legal system. 
In the U.S., it is a "legal entity," entirely separate from and independent 
of its owners. Unlike proprietorships and partnerships, whch are formed 
simply by the volition of the parties involved and have no separate legal 
status, a corporation is formed by a specially granted permission from 
the state. 
Informally, t h s  process is as follows. The group of people who want 
to start the corporation, called its p r o m o t e r s ,  submit registration infor- 
mation, called i n c o r p o r a t i o n  p a p e r s ,  and a p r o s p e c t u s ,  which describes 
the capital structure and intended function of the corporation to the 
governing state. If the corporation is to engage in interstate commerce, 
the prospectus must also be approved by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). 
In addition, a c e r t i f i c a t e  of i n c m p o r a t i o n  is filed by the promotors, 
which, if approved, is maintained by the office of the secretary of the 
state of incorporation. Tlus certificate lists the corporation's principal 
offices, names of directors and incorporators, the total number of stock 
shares (each a t  a common value called the p a r  v a l u e )  and the name and 
number of shares held by each stockholder. The corporation cannot sell 
more than t h s  initial number of shares without obtaining additional per- 
mission from the state. On acceptance by the state, t h s  certificate 
becomes the corporation's c h a r t m .  
Ths charter is a contractual permission by the state which, in gross 
terms, says the following: Stockholders have a right to vote members of 
the board of directors (a t  least three people) of the firm and to partici- 
pate in the division of residual assets on the dissolution of the firm. 
The board of director's main responsibility is to  appoint officers of 
the corporation, which serve as the agents of the corporation in legal 
transactions (e.g., engaging the corporation in contracts, hiring and 
management of employees). 
Only the officers, and the people they employ, can engage in the 
direct operation of the firm. Note that being a stockholder does not 
carry the right to participate in the management of the corporation nor 
to act as its agent in contracts. 
To summarize, a corporation is essentially a locus of ownershp, on 
one hand, and a locus of contractual commitment on the other. (These 
will define the two sides of the corporate balance sheet: its assets and its 
liabilities, including stockholder equity.) Changes in the things owned by 
the corporation and its commitments to other parties are made by the 
corporate officers and their employees, acting as agents. Corporate off- 
icers are appointed by the Board of Directors whch  in turn are voted by 
the stockholders. 
A crucial issue from a formal standpoint, however, is the identifica- 
tion of t h s  locus of ownership and commitment. If we simply dismiss it 
as an 'abstract object' having no spatial/temporal location, we are left 
with the theoretical as well as very pragmatic problem of determining 
when the corporation exists and the boundaries of its rlghts and obliga- 
tions. 
However, as noted above, the critical event in the formation of a cor- 
poration is the granting, by the secretary of the state of jurisdiction, of 
the corporate charter. This provides the creation of the corporation with 
a unique location in space and time. Furthermore, the corporate charter 
provides the corporation with a unique co.rporate n a m e  (withn that 
state). This provides any subsequent contracts and titles of ownership 
with a reference to the corporate charter, and hence to a unique 
spatial/ temporal location. 
Though t h s  provides the means to identify a corporation, we have 
still not explained what a corporation is. Clearly, it is not in itself some- 
thing physical. Rather it is a complex of contingent rights and privileges 
as established by the corporate laws of the state. 
Let us refer to t h s  complex as CORP-RIGHTS. These are granted by a 
particular state,  and associated to a unique (within the state) corporate 
name. Using the notation described earlier for permission under the law 
of state p, this would be 
where v is a variable of type c,  a character string indicating the name of 
the corporation. This describes the situation where state p permits cor- 
porate rights associated with name v. 
The types of t h s  expression are: 
OLP CORP-RIGHTS (v) 
That is, the characteristic function of CORP-RIGHTS maps from character 
strings to truth values. The state's legal permission is a mapping from an 
entity (the state) and the previous expression to a truthvalue. 
We would like to say that the corporation is simply this permission. 
However, if we are speaking of a certain time, t ,  the corporation is not 
simply this permission at  time t but to account for the corporation's own- 
ership of assets, it must also include permission at  previous times when 
the assets were acquired. Further, if the corporation is in operation it 
will presumably have contractual obligations to other parties. These 
involve evaluation of these corporate rights not only in future times but 
under alternative circumstances, i.e., in other possible worlds. 
What we need then is to evaluate the corporate rights predicate not 
just currently in the 'actual' world, but across all times and in all possible 
worlds. Ths,  as explained in Part I is provided by the intension operator, 
I I A I ,  
. Thus 
The earlier expression was of type <<e,<c,v>>,v>. The present expres- 
sion will therefore be of type <s,<<e,<c,v>>,v>>, i.e., adding the addi- 
tional argument of type s ,  which is an index to a possible world, time pair. 
Thus the characteristic function of this expression evaluates whether the 
corporate rights associated with name v are permitted by state p a t  each 
possible index. This, in our view, is what a corporation is. Hence 
PRIVATE-CORPORATION(X) ::= j y  32 STATE(Y) & CHAR-STRING(Z) & 
x = AIO~,y CORP-RIGHTS(Z)] 
The discussion here has been directed towards the formal descrip- 
tion of private  co.rporations, i.e., those which are  profit oriented and have 
stockholders who ultimately receive these profits either through dividend 
distribution or dissolution of the corporation and sale of its assets, 
Other types of corporations might also be described with a similar 
form of analysis. For instance, non- profi t  corporations do not have 
stockholders nor do they pay income tax. @ a s i p u b l i c  corporations are  
private corporations which provide certain public services (e.g., certain 
utilities, toll roads) and wh ch  are supervised by public authorities. Pub- 
lic coqmrat ions ,  such as  cities and certain department of locaI and state 
governments, also provide public services but are  financed by the state. 
Each of these present certain variants on the concept of corporation we 
have just described. 
Adhtionally, the concepts of state and federal governments them- 
selves pre'sent a challenge to formal description. Indeed, they appear to 
be corporate-like entities, having no essential physical existence. How- 
ever, in these cases one cannot appeal to a larger deontic framework as 
the basis for their definition, for they a r e  this framework. Instead, a t  
least in democratic societies, one would appeal to  the consensus of the 
voting population (present and past) as a deontic basis. However, since 
our objectives here are to primarily concerned with commercial and 
financial activities, we confine our discussion only to the three classes of 
economic actors described above: proprietorships, par tnershps ,  and 
private corporations. Hence, 
U-C. ECONOMIC OBdECTS 
Physical Objects 
The most obvious type of economic object a re  physical ones (i.e.,  
having mass). As before, to admit these types of entities into the descrip- 
tive formalism we must be able to locate them in a spatial/temporal 
framework. For most types of physical objects we think of--e.g., tables, 
chairs, automobiles, real estate, this is unproblematic. However, when 
granular substances such as corn and wheat, or liquids or gases are 
involved, problems of identification arise because of the fluid movement 
of these substances. For instance consider a contract to buy a certain 
volume of ocean water located at  a certain latitude and longtitude a t  a 
given depth, etc. Though the geographical coordinates may be certain, 
the particular volume of ocean water a t  this location is not. 
The practical device that resolves t h s  logical problem in nearly any 
reasonable commercial context is that of a container .  Liquids, gases and 
grains are always handled in a container of some sort, and the container 
provides the fluid substance with a unique and stable spatial/temporal 
location and with that discrete identifiability. 
Thus, our attention here is confined to what we call discre te-  
phys i ca l -  objec ts ,  which have distinct spatial/ temporal coordinates (for 
instance a t  their center of gravity) and can be uniquely identified and 
named. Liquids, gases and grains are assumed always to appear withn 
discrete containers so that the filled container is itself a discrete physical 
object. 
We are concerned here with those types of objects that can be 
owned. Normally, any discrete physical object can be owned; however 
U.S, law specifically excludes one type, persons (slavery having been abol- 
ished). Hence, we introduce a concept of LPHYS-OBJ (legal physical 
object) whlch are those that can be owned: 
Promissory Objects 
If one examines asset side of the balance sheet of a company (whch 
lists categories of what the company owns) one of course finds a number 
of categories which are types of physical objects, e.g., land, plant and 
equipment, inventory. However , beyond these there are typically other 
categories that do not comprise physical objects-e.g., accounts receiv- 
able, negotiable securities, patents, licenses. 
These are what we call deontic objec ts .  They arise as the result of a 
contractual permission of whch the company is the beneficiary, i.e., they 
are 'rights' permitting the company to do something (as with licenses) or 
obhgations of other parties to the company (as with accounts receivables, 
and negotiable securities). 
We consider the case of contractual permissions first. Ths is a per- 
mission by some other party, say x, to the economic actor, call it y, to do 
some action, say i P .  Hence 
P(x,y)Q. 
We would like to say that y owns this permisison. However, it is not 
the assertion itself that y owns, but its sense or 'intension,' that is, its 
interpretation across all possible worlds and times.* This is given by once 
again using the intension operator: 
Thus, to intent a term for the 'object' form of a permission, we call it 
LPRMLEGE (legal privilege). Hence for economic actors "y" and "z" and 
some action, "act" 
LPRMLEGE(x)::= 3 y l z j a c t  ~ = ~ [ p ( y , z ) a c t ]  
The treatment for the case of contractual obligations is similar. 
Here we will call the object form an LPROMISE (legal promise). Again for 
*Note: Contractual permission was defined in terms of general permission (deontic possibili- 
ty) which in turn had a semantic interpretation across possible worlds and times. Thus con- 
tractual permission is not just permission in the present but in certain future times and cir- 
cumstances as qualified by a.  Use of the intension operator here thus appears as a second 
lambda abstraction across indices. The purpose of this second abstraction is essentially to 
'objectiiy' the permission, equating it with its characteristic function across possible worlds 
and times. 
economic actors "y" and "2" and an action, "act," 
LPROMISE(x)::= g y g z g a c t  x = ~ [ o ( ~ , z )  act]. 
A deontic object is one of either of these types: 
Monetary Objects 
Money is obviously an important type of object in the description of 
commercial and financial phenomena. If we consider money only in the 
form of 'hard cash, '  i. e . ,  coins and bills, money is simply a type of physi- 
cal object: 
Coins and bills are  obviously of a particular national currency and have a 
face value. Thus for instance in the U.S., predicates indicating common 
types of bills and coins are 
etc.  
However, in commercial transactions, money is seldom handled a t  
this detail level, but rather as sums of money. In this case we add up the 
face values of the various coins and bills, and convert them to  a common 
currency unit-e.g., cents or dollars. 
Thus, suppose that y is a set of coins and bills, x,, ..., x,. Then the 
monetary value of y, say n, would be given by a measurement function: 
y = ix ,,..., x,! & MONEY-VALUE(y, Dollar, US) = n 
Note here that the measurement function has a third place indicating the 
nationality of the currency, for instance to distinguish measurement in 
U.S. dollars versus Canadian dollars. (Exchange rates between currencies 
are described as the tabulated face value of one currency exchangeable 
for a unit tabulated face value in another currency.) 
Since our examples here have assumed a U.S. environment, we intro- 
duce as a notational convenience an abbreviation for money in U.S, dol- 
lars: 
t (y)=n ::= MO?!GI-VALUE(y, Dollar, US)=n 
This measurement function is for tabulating face values of a sum of 
currency in a given nationality. Measuring one nation's currency in terms 
of another with t h s  function would thus evaluate zero. 
So far we have regarded money as a special type of physical object. 
However, the services provided by lending institutions in most countries 
have extended t h s  concept of money. 
In the U.S., it is quite common that a bank check is given and 
accepted in lieu of cash money. These checks are made against 'demand 
deposit' accounts in a bank, whch  promises to pay the payee named on 
the check a sum of money whose tabulated value equals the amount 
specified on the check. 
Demand deposits are thus a deontic object, indicating the obligation 
of the bank, say b, to the party named on the check, say x, an amount of 
money, assuming U.S. dollars, n: 
Reading: a demand deposit from bank b to party x in amount n for some 
amount of money m,  whose tabulated face value in U.S. dollar is n, b 
given ownership of m to x. 
Because checking accounts are used so often, we introduce another 
notational abbreviation to indicate money either in the form of cash or 
check: 
The two abbreviations for U.S. dollars correspond to the two concepts of 
money used by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board to calculate the money 
supply. Our notation $ corresponds to the money supply measure, MI, 
our $3, corresponds to M2. 
Information Objects 
Physical objects, deontic objects and money account for most of the 
types of objects that are owned by economic actors and traded in com- 
mercial transactions. 
However, there appears to be one additional class of ownable and 
tradable objects not yet included: what we call information objects. 
Informally, an  information object is some meaningful arrangement of 
symbolic patterns on a representational medium, e.g., ink on paper or 
electronic codes on a magnetic tape or disk. 
Our concept of information object corresponds to what Thompson 
(1981) calls "ethereal goods." He makes the excellent observation that  
what is distinct about t h s  type of object is the technology of its reproduc- 
tion. Thus, t o  h m ,  an ehtereal good is one that  can be reproduced more 
cheaply than it can be purchased. 
Thus, up until the time of the photocopy machine, a book was not an  
ethereal good. Now there are many books that  are  cheaper to  photo-copy 
than purchase from the publisher (especially low volume technical 
books). 
Similarly, home stereo tape recorders made i t  cheaper to  copy musi- 
cal recordings than buy them. 
However, the innovation that really expanded the class of ethereal 
goods was the electronic computer. A fundamental concept in this tech- 
nology is that  data is easily and instantly copyable. Hence any informa- 
tion converted for computer storage (or indeed programs directing the 
processing of data) can be instantaneously reproduced (copied to another 
magnetic medium or sent over communication lines) a t  practically no 
cost.  
Since considerable labor is often expended in the original creation of 
such information objects, the legal problem this presents is how to pro- 
tec t  the developer from having his/her work "stolen," i.e., reproduced, 
without compensation. 
Our concern here, however, is only with the description of these 
types of objects. As we have seen, their essential characteristics are not 
the physical medium on which they are represented, but their reproduc- 
tibility. 
In owning such an information object, therefore, one of course owns 
the physical representation medium, but more importantly, one owns 
rights controlling the reproduction of the object. (Thus, the copyright 
laws for textual material prescribe the "copy rights" of the author and 
publisher.) 
Thus, in the perspective here, the essential features of an informa- 
tion object are very similar to that of a license, i.e., a contractual permis- 
sion from one party to another. In the case of information objects, the 
permitted action is a certain limited range of reproduction. Let us refer 
to instances of these actions is LTD-REPRODUCTION!!. In acquiring an 
information object, one therefore acquires a physical representation of 
the information object plus certain rights of limited reproduction. 
Let k be this physical representation, x be the party acquiring the 
information object, and y be the author or holder of the copyright of the 
object. Then the rights transferred, which for us is the information 
object is defined as follows: 
Reading: An information object, z, is defined as for some parties x and y 
and a physical representation k, the permission of y to x to certain 
actions of limited reproduction of k. 
An economic actor is defined: 
ECON-ACTOR(x) ::= LPERSON(x) V PROPRIETORSHIP(x) V PARTNERSHIP(x) 
V CORPORATION(x) 
An economic object is defined: 
As noted earlier, the class of monetary objects comprises certain 
physical objects (coins and bills) and certain deontic objects (demand 
deposits). Also, an information object has both physical and deontic 
aspects to it--the physical representation of the original and the limited 
rights of reproduction. Thus the above definition of economic object is 
redundant to this extent. 
The two place predicates OWN and POSS were taken as primitive. To 
indicate that each is a relation between economic actors and economic 
objects, we have the following controlling axioms: 
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E. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
III-A INTRODUCTION 
In Par t  1, the formal descriptive language CANDID was developed. In 
Par t  11 this was applied to the description of the principal entities of 
economic activity, what we called economic actors and economic objects. 
In this part ,  we extend the application of CANDID to consider the 
processes of economic activity itself, in describing the concepts of ele- 
mentary finance, i.e., common types of transactions and financial instru- 
ments. We find this domain to be not only a fairly central and important 
one t o  understanding commercial activity more broadly, but also reason- 
ably representative of the classes of conceptual problems likely to arise 
in efforts t o  formalize other aspects of business. We thus believe that  
analogous analyses could be applied for instance t o  financial accounting, 
cost accounting, tax law, contract law, regulatory law, etc. Again, we want 
to  emphasize that CANDID is proposed as a f r a m e w o r k  for formalizing 
business theory, but is not intended as a theory itself. The discussion 
here is thus meant to be only illustrative, attempting to capture what we 
see as the ordinary usage and understanding of basic financial terminol- 
ogy and concepts. Various contemporary theories of accounting, finance 
and economics might therefore disagree with aspects of the analysis 
given here. (The only responsibility we would claim for CANDID is to expli- 
cate this disagreement.) 
As a general guide to what concepts should be included here, we 
made use of Mathematics of B a n c e  (Ayres, F., Jr . ,  Shaum's Outline 
Series, McGraw Hill, 1963), beginning level college primer. This is lkewise 
suggested as an  elementary background reference. 
Ill-B. ADDITIONAL DEF'INITIONS, NOTATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
In Part I1 the concepts of an economic a c t o r  and an economic  object  
were developed. Informally, an economic actor is a legally able person or 
organization (proprietorshp, partnership or corporation) whle an 
economic object is a physical object (excluding persons), a contractual 
object (e.g., stock, bonds, licenses), a monetary object (cash or demand 
deposit checks) or an information object (e.g., textual materials, com- 
puter data and programs). 
In addition, two two-place relations between economic actors and 
economic objects were assumed, OWN (for ownership) and POSS (for pos- 
session). These have the following associated axioms: 
Also, the notation 88 is used to indicate U.S.  currency in cash or 
check form. E.g., 
indicates that the object m is a sum of money totaling 8158.32. 
As in the earlier parts, parentheses are used for functional applica- 
tion arguments for predicates and functions), whle square brackets are 
used for syntactic disambiguation. Also, to reduce the notation, a colon is 
used to abbreviate a left bracket matched by an implicit right bracket 
before the next open right bracket or a t  the end of the sentence, which- 
ever comes first. 
Also as previously, predicates may indicate states, changes or 
actions. As a visual aid, we append "!" to p rehca te  names for changes 
and "!!" to  names of actions. Thus, as in Par t  11 we have the following 
definitions of changes and action relating to ownership and possession. 
OCHANGE! (x,y,z) :: = OWN(x,z) T OWN(y,z) 
PCHANGE!(X,Y,Z) ::= POSS(X,Y) T POSS(~ ,Z)  
OCHANGE! indicates a change in ownership of z from x to y. PCHANGE! 
indicates an  analogous change of possession. 
OGNE!! indicates a change of ownershp from x to  y of z initiated by x, 
whereas OTAKE!! indca tes  the same change of ownership, but initiated by 
y. PGNE!! and PTAKE!! are  defined similarly but for possession. 
One additional definition is added for the purposes of t h s  par t ,  a n  
action, PROMISE!!, indicating the creation and giving of a "deontic object," 
i.e., (the intension of) a contractual obligation or permission: 
Also, we will here need a shorthand device for describing series of 
conjuncts that vary only in the definition of variable names and certain 
numeric parameters. We call t h s  device i terat im and define it as follows. 
The notation 
is read "for i from 1 to n" and is meant to assign integer values to  i  = 
1,2, ... ,n. Further, for a variable p, 
is replaced with respective subscripts i = 1, ..., n. 
Thus for a formula i P ,  containing variables p,. . . ,V 
[ I  s i sz n]: ip(p[i] , . . . ,  v [ i ] )  ::= i P ( p l , . , . , v l )  & @ ( p z  ,..., V Z )  & ... i P ( h , . . . , v , )  
III-C. ELEMENTARY FINANCIAL CONCEPTS 
bans 
Loans are a familiar and everyday concept. We think usually of a 
loan as letting someone use something of ours with the understanding 
that they will return it to us at  a later time. Implicit in t h s  notion of 
lending is the expectation that the borrower return the same object lent. 
We call this a loan in substance. For instance, renting a car or house 
involve loans in substance. 
Another type of loan, one which is especially common in business, 
might be called a loan in kind. Here the expectation is that the object 
returned need not be the same object, but only of the same type. For 
instance, loans of money, grain or oil are typically loans in kind. 
These two types of loans are  discriminated in CANDID as follows: 
LOAN-IN-SUBSTANCE!! (x,y, z,t) ::= 
PGIVE!!(X,~,Z)  & (3 p) PROMISE! !(y,x,p) & 
p = "O(x,y): RD(t): PGIVE!!(y,x,z)] 
Reading: x, the lender, gives y, the borrower, the object z, and y prom- 
ises x that it be obligatory for y to realize sometime during time t the giv- 
ing back of the  same object, z. 
LOAN-IN-KIND!! (x,y,$, t) : := 
(321) @(zl) 
& PGTVE!!(x,y,z,) & ( g p )  PROMISE!! (y,z,p) & 
P = "O(x,y): (3 22) 9(z2) & RD(t) PGlVX!(y,x,z2)] 
The reading here is similar to  before except that  now the object returned 
is not necessarily that  same one, but only one that  satisfies the same 
predicate, 9 .  Note that this second object does not necessarily exist 
when the LOAN-IN-KIND! ! is realized. 
]Loans of Money 
Loans of money are loans in kind where 9 is a money predicate. Most 
commonly, however, the borrower is obligated to  repay a larger amount 
than what was borrowed, the difference being the interest  of the loan. A 
loan of money with interest is thus a loan involving two kinds: 
LOAN-OF-TWO-KINDS!! (x,y,@ .Ir, t) :: = 
(3 2,) 9(z1) & OGTVE!!(x,y,zl) & ( gp )  PROMISE!! (x.y,p) & 
p = AIO(x,y): (3  z2) +(z2) & (RD(t): OGTVE!! (x,y,z2) 
Here, x gives z l  (whlch satisfies 9) to  y, in exchange for y's promise to 
later return to  x some object zz, which satisfies \k. Thus the t h n g  given 
and the thing returned neither are the same thing, nor do they even 
satisfy the same predicate. This hardly seems like a loan any more. How- 
ever, in loans of money, @ and \k are both money predicates which differ 
only in amount. For simplicity, let us assume that  the currency is U.S. 
dollars. Then, a loan of money with interest can be defined more specifi- 
cally as follows: 
LOAN-OF-MONEY I!! (x,y , Q, t )  :: = 
(gm,)  88(ml)=nl & OGIVE!!(x,y,ml) & 
(3 p) PROMISE! !(y,x,p) & 
p = "[O(x,y): (3mz)  $$(m2)=n2 & (RD(t): OGTVE!!(y,x,m2)] 
It is more usual t o  specify the second amount of money as a multiple of 
the first. The common method is to designate a fraction, rl, (where 100 
r, = percentage) which is the incremental portion of the  first amount to 
be added in repayment. In this form we have: 
It is also common, a t  least in the U.S. to specify r l  as  an annual rate;  
i.e., the actual multiplier to  be apphed to  nl ,  call it rz, is determined by 
multiplying r, by the  duration of t in years. 
Thus the loan of money pr,edicate which takes r to  be an  annual rate 
would be as follows: 
where "Dur" measures the duration in years of the time span t .  
The interpretation so far has been that the borrower is obliged to 
repay the principal and interest some time within the period t .  As 
described in this last predicate, the borrower must pay the full amount of 
interest irregardless of how early in this period re-payment is made. 
While this is in fact the condition of some loans, others limit the amount 
of interest to apply only to the period up to the point of repayment. This 
form of loan would be defined as follows: 
LOAN-OF-MONEY~!!(X,~,~~,~~,~~) ::= 
(3m1) Ifb$(ml)=nl & OGTVE!!(x,y,m,) & 
(3 p) PROMISE! !(y,x,p) & 
P = "O(~,Y) :  (3m2) ( L  t2) (3t3): 
End(t2) < End(tl) & 
RT(t2) [OGITX! !(y,x,mz)] & 
Beg(tS)=Beg(tl) & End(t3)=End(t2) & 
$Ifb(m2)= m + (1 + r l  + Dur(ts,Yr))) 
Reading: For some money, ml, in the amount n,, x gives this money to y; 
y promises that for some other money, mz, a unique time span t2 and 
some other time span, t3, where t2 ends before t l  ends and throughout t2, 
y gives x the money, m2, and tor the time span t3 which began with t ,  and 
ended with tz, mz is an amount of money equal to n1 plus the interest on 
nl over time t3. 
Note that the promise in t h s  case involved the introduction of two 
time periods, tz and t3, where tp was the (relatively short) time in which 
repayment is realized throughout, while t3 was the time from the start of 
the loan to this repayment. 
Simple vs Compound Interest 
The interest computation in the last case is called simple interest. 
Often a more complex computation is used called compound interest, The 
basic effect of this is that for some time interval, called the compounding 
period, the interest for the period is computed and added to the principal 
for the subsequent computation. 
Suppose the loan is for 81,000 at  an annual rate of .05 for three 
years. Assuming a compounding period of a year, a comparison of the 
two methods is as follows: 
End of year Simple Interest Compound Interest 
princ int princ int 
Total (princ + int) 3150 $31 57.62 
Compounding is obviously advantageous to the lender. The computations 
for simple and compound interest, assuming principal = m, annual rate = 
r, total loan duration t l ,  w.d compounding period t2, are as follows: 
nsimp = m (1 + + Dur(tl,Yr))) 
ncomp = m (1 + r) ++ Dur(tl,tz) 
While adding arithmetic complexity, compounding does not seriously 
complicate the descriptive complexity of our calculus. To modify the pre- 
vious example to reflect compounding, one would simply change the for- 
mula for the amount of m2 in the last line. 
Present Value of a Debt 
A loan or debt has value to the lender. Insofar as the promised 
future repayments are reasonably assured, the lender typically regards 
this as a component of his/her present  wealth, even though it is only the 
promissory object which is actually owned. (Wealth here is taken to be 
the collection of things owned, according t o  the CANDID definition of 
OWN.) In business it is very important to measure these and other forms 
of wealth. Since it is by the proxy of such measurements that economic 
objects are made numerically comparable, decision making is simplified 
by reducing it to arithmetic calculations and comparisons. Usually 
wealth is measured in monetary terms. For cash, wealth obviously is the 
total face amount of the currency. For physical and informational 
objects, wealth is typically measured as the original amount of cash paid 
for the object (sometimes with an adjustment for deterioration and/or 
obsolescence). With respect to promissory objects for fu ture  cash, one 
might initially value them as the amount of the cash expected. However, 
most business and economic theorists would regard this as incorrect for 
two reasons: 
a) there is always some chance that the borrower may renege on 
the promise and the future cash may not be collectable. 
b) if the total amount to be paid were immediately available, one 
could invest it elsewhere (e.g., in a bank, securities, other loans) 
and make additional interest. 
Thus a promise for future cash is usually regarded as having less  mone- 
tary value than an equal amount in the present. Ths more conservative 
valuation is termed the present va lue  of the promise. 
While our concern in CANDID is with the formal description of 
phenomena only, and not with va luat ion  (which we see as a problem for 
accounting and economics), there is a commonly accepted and used 
inethod for computing the present value of future cash receipts that we 
feel should be mentioned here. 
This method involves the assumption of a rate, d, called the discount 
r a t e  which might be considered as a sort of counter-factual interest rate.  
It is the hypothetical average rate of return at  which cash presently avaii- 
able could be invested. 
Considering some future cash amount, n,, expected after a period t,, 
the present value is the amount, n2, which if invested now at  the discount 
rate would yield money in the amount n,. That is, 
hence. 
Partial Payments 
Loans are often re-paid in a series of partial payments rather than as 
a lump sum. Sometimes these are of equal size and in regular intervals, 
though not necessarily. With respect to partial payments, it is important 
to distinguish the requirements of the loan from the options available to 
the borrower. For instance, a loan may specify payment of 36 monthly 
installments of a certain amount. Sometimes, however, the terms of the 
loan may disallow early payment. Ths,  as we will understand it here, is 
not to be taken literally. Early payment is always advantageous to the 
lender. By such a stipulation, it is generally intended that the borrower 
will receive no reduction in interest due by such pre-payment. This is 
basically the distinction made in the predicates LOAN-OF-MONGI3!! and 
LOAN-OF-MONEY4!! above. As observed there, the difference in the loan 
specification is that in the latter case, the amount of interest depends on 
the time of pre-payment. To describe loans involving partial repayments 
with no adjustments of interest for early payment, we can ignore the 
interest computation and regard the borrower's promise as a series of 
payments of certain pre-specified amounts n,, Q, ..., nk required on or 
before certain dates, t,, tz, ..., tk. The borrowerWs obligation in this case 
simply covers a series of realization formulas in conjunction. For 
instance, suppose that on Jan. 1, 1980 John Doe ( j )  borrows $1000 from his 
local bank (b), with repayment specified in three amounts as follows: 
$250 on Dec. 31, 1982 
$500 on Dec. 31, 1983 
8300 on Dec. 31, 1984. 
The CANDID description of thls loan event and John's obligation are as fol- 
lows: 
RD((Date(l,l,l980)): ( 3 m l )  l l ( m l )  = 1000 
& OGTVE!!(b,j,ml) & ( l p )  PROMISE!!(j,b,p) & 




( 3  tl) (3 t2) (3 ts): 
Beg(tl)=Beg(t2)=Beg(t3)=Beg(Date(l, 1,1980)) & 
End(tl)=End(Date(31, 12,1982)) & 
End(t2)=End(Date(31, 12,1983)) & 
End(t3)=End(Date(31, 12,1984)) & 
RD(t,) [OGlVE!!(j,b,m,)] & 
RD(t2) [OGIVE!!(j ,b,mz)] & 
RD(ts) [OGNE!! (j ,  b,m3)] 
A more common formulation of a loan involves a series of equal size 
payments over regular intervals. The intervals most commonly used are 
that of a month or year which, as was noted earlier, are of varying length 
but nonetheless unambiguous. A loan of amount nl to be repaid as a 
series of k installments each of size n2 in intervals of length t1 beginning 
a t  time to is described as follows: 
LOAN-OF-MONEY5!!(x,y,nl,n2,k,tl,to) ::= 
(3 ml): 88(ml)=nl & OGTVE!!(x,y,ml) & 
(2p):  PROMISE!!(x,y,m,) & 
p = 90(x,y):  [i = 1, k]: (2t[ i])  ( Im[i] ) :  
Beg(t[i])=Beg(to) & Dur(t[i])=tl & 
$$(m[i])=nz & 
RD(t[i]): OGTVE!!(y,x,m[i]) 
These descriptions provide for no reduction in interest for early pay- 
ment. When that  is the case, a modification analogous to that  in LOAN- 
OF-MONE;Y4!! is required. 
In the last section we looked mainly a t  the process of loaning money. 
That is, the lender gave some sum of money in exchange for the 
borrower's promise to pay it  back in various ways. We now broaden our 
scope to include other financial mechanisms. As shall be seen, the  notion 
of promise, hence promissory objects, will continue to play a central role. 
In approximate accordance with general usage, we refer to the prom- 
ises themselves as financial instmments. Also in deference to  general 
usage, the terminology of "lender" and "borrower" needs to  be general- 
ized. Broadly, we will call these the "promises" and "promissor," respec- 
tively. In more narrow contexts, these parties will be assigned more 
specific role names. 
Leases 
Leases are agreements involving monetary payments in exchange for 
rental or temporary possession of a physical economic object, e.g.,  an 
apartment, house, car, truck, machine, building, land. Accountants are 
quick to focus on the temporariness of this possession, and when it 
approximates the useful We of the object, they argue that the lease effec- 
tively amounts to a sale of the object plus a corresponding financing 
arrangement (loan). The technicality of casting such would-be sales as 
leases often has certain tax advantages. 
Leases where the duration of possession is short relative to the 
object's life are termed operat ing  l eases .  Those where the possession 
approximates the useful life of the object are f inancia l  l e a s e s .  
Let p be a promise (promissory object) to pay certain amounts of 
cash over a specified period. Then a rental for an object, z ,  over a period 
t l ,  is described as follows: 
LEASEl!!(x,y,z,t,,p,) ::= 
PG~VE!!(X,Y,Z) at P R O M I S E ! ! ( ~ , X , ~ ~ )  & 
(3 pz) PROMISE!! (y,x,p2) & 
pz = AIO(x,y): RD(tl): PGIVE!! (y,x,z)] 
Reading: x gives possession of z to y and y makes the promise pl (left 
unspecified, but presumably to pay money), and in addition y agrees to 
the promise pz which is the obligation to realize during t l  the giving back 
of possession of z to x. Here the roles indicated as x and y are usually 
termed "lessor" and "lessee." Note: as described here, the lease involves 
two plromises: p, to pay money, and pz, to return the rented object. Had 
we wished to specify p, these could have been combined as a single prom- 
ise. 
Financial leases often provide an option for the lessee to purchase 
the object at the end of the lease period for a usually insignificant 
amount, call it nl. Such a provision is incorporated as follows: 
LEASE1!!(x,y,z,tl,pl,nl) ::= 
PGTVE!!(x,y,z) & PROMISE!! (y,x,pl) & 
( 3 ~ ~ )  PROMISE! !(y,x,p2) & 
Pz = AIO(x,y): 3m1) ss(ml)=nl & 
((RD(tl) PGNE!!(y,x,z)) W 
(RD(tl) OGNE!! (y,x,ml) T OCHANGE!(x,y,z))] 
Reading: x gives to y plossession of z; y promises p (unspecified cash pay- 
ments) to x; y also promises pz to x; the effect of p2 is the obligation that: 
for some money ml in the amount n,, either y gives to x the object z, or y 
gives to x the money ml ,  in whch case there is an (automatic) ownership 
change from x to y of the object z. 
Options 
Options as a general concept are a sort of conditional promise sub- 
ject to the promisee's control. The two parties involved are sometimes 
distinguished as the issum of the option (the promissor) and the option 
holder (the promisee). 
Let Q1 and Q2 be temporally unbound states of affairs, and t1 be the 
span of time in whch the option holds. Then the CANDID description of 
this is as follows. The general form of an option is the issuer's promise 
that if the holder acts to bring about the state of affairs Q1, then the 
issuer is obligated to act to bring about state 62: 
OPTION!!(x,y,Q1,Q2,tl) ::= 
(3 p) PROMISE!! (x,y,p) & 
p = A[~(x,y):(b'tp) [PT(t2,tl) & RT(t2) T (61 ( I  x) *))I --, 
[(St311 Beg( t~>=End( tJ  & RD(td T (62 (1 Y) *))I] 
Reading: x makes some promise to y that for any time t2 in t l ,  if x brings 
about Q1 (from any state instead of any state) then it is obligatory that 
for some t3 whch begins as y ends, it is realized during t3 that y brings 
about Q2 (from any state instead of any state). 
Commonly occurring types of options are  made for the purchase or 
sale of publicly traded stock, usually in units of 100 shares. 
A "call" is an option to buy 100 shares of stock a t  a predetermined 
price. Obviously, if the market price of the stock goes above this pre-set 
price, one can exercise the option and sell the stock in the open market 
a t  a profit. Thus, for stock in company z, a t  a call price of m, a call can 
be defined in terms of the preceding definition for an option as follows: 
where 
Here, 61, the condition of the option, is that x gives y money in the 
amount nl. Q2, the obligation initiated by 61, is that y gives a collection 
consisting of 100 shares of stock in company z to x. 
A "put" is the converse of a call. It is a n  option to sell 100 shares of 
stock at a pre-established price. The holder's strategy in a put is usually 
that if the market price declines to below the pre-set price, the holder 
can buy the lower cost stock in the market and then exercise the option 
in order to sell it at the bgher  put price. 
The CANDID definition of a put is quite similar to a call; simply, the 
definitions of Q1 and 62 are interchanged: 
where, 
Other types of options derive from puts and calls. A "spread" is a 
combination of a put and a call written on the same stock and running for 
the same length of time. The put price is below the current market, wble 
the call price is above it. A "straddle" is a spread where the put and call 
prices are equal. These would be described as conjuncts of a call and a 
put. A spread has two prices whereas a straddle has only one: 
Insurance 
Insurance is a promise contingent upon some change of state in 
nature, rather than an action controlled by one of the parties to the 
promise. Let Q1 be a temporally unbound formula describing the event 
(e.g., Earthquake( ), Fire( ), Flood( )), and let t l  be the time in whch the 
insurance is valid. Let Q2 be a formula describing the payment by the 
insurer if the event occurs. Then the general structure of an insurance 
policy is as follows: 
INSURANCE!! (x,y,Q 1,Q2, t l )  : := 
(3 p) PROMISE! ! (x, y, p) & 
P = [(vtz): [PT(tz,tl) & RT(t2) Q l ]  -+ 
AIO(x,~):  (3 t3) Beg(td=End(tz) BL RD(t3) 6211 
Reading: x makes some promise to y that for any time t2 on t1 wherein Q1 
is realized throughout, then it is obligatory following t2 that Q2 be real- 
ized. 
For instance, suppose party x writes insurance for party y against a 
fire in some building z for the appraised amount of the damage up to a 
maximum limit of $100,000. We assume a numeric function, Min(nx,ny), 
which returns the smaller of its two numeric arguments, and another 
numeric function, ~ppraisal(z) ,  whch returns the dollar amount of the 
fire damage. Then this fire insurance policy is specified as follows: 
Easements, Licenses 
Easements and licenses are promissory objects involving permission 
rather than obligation. Easements are the "rights" of persons other than 
the owner in the use of real property (land). Presumably these rights are 
restricted to some particular actions or activities. If not, we would 
characterize the unrestricted right as possession and view the easement 
as a rental contract or lease. 
Typical kinds of easements are permissions to drive on the property, 
to have a building located on it, etc. These would not constitute full pos- 
session in that such other activities as extracting oil or minerals, growing 
crops, etc. are usually not included in this permission. 
Let Q be the allowed activity. Then the granting of an easement by x 
to y on the property x over the t i n e  period t, is as follows: 
EASEMENT!!(x,y,z,Q,t,) ::= 
(2 p) PROMISE! ! (x,y,p) & 
P = A [ ~ ( x , ~ ) :  RD(t1) Q] 
Reading: x makes a promise to y that y may (but doesn't have to) realize 
(one or more times) during the activity Q during the time period t l .  
A license, a t  least as we understand it here, is the general case of an 
easement. That is, it is the licensor's (promissor's) permission to the 
Licensee (promisee) to perform certain actions that normally would be 
forbidden. This permission is not restricted to  rights to use real pro- 
perty. 
For instance, a common type of license is for patent rights. In this 
case, the licensor allows the normal patent protection to be suspended 
for the licensee. 
Again, let  Q be the activity permitted, and t l  be the period of this 
permission. The general form of a license is then: 
License!!(x,y,Q,t,) ::= 
(3 p) PROMISE! !(x,y,p) & 
P = "P(x,Y): RD(tl) Ql 
Reading: x makes a promise to y to the effect that y may do Q repeatedly 
during time t l .  
Debt Instruments 
Loans as we discussed them in the earlier section were regarded as a 
particular promise (to pay cash) from one individual to another. Loans of 
this type, especially when the period of the promise is less than 5 years, 
are usually called notes.  
B o n d s  are another type of loan. Usually these are for a period longer 
than five years. The promissor in these cases is generally an economic 
organization, e.g. ,  a corporation or governmental body, rather than a per- 
son. The promisee (bond holder) in these cases may however be either 
type of economic actor. Also, bonds usually occur as a collection of 
promises to a number of parties. The collection is referred to as a bond 
i s s u e .  The elements of each collective bond issue have a common agent, 
starting date and terms of payment. They differ in the technicality that 
different money is promised in each bond, though the a m o u n t  of the 
money is the same, and that the recipients may be different in each case. 
Two major classes of bonds are distinguished based on how the reci- 
pients are identified. A r e g i s t e r e d  bond is one where the bond issuer 
maintains a record of each recipient. The bond can only be transferred 
by the endorsement of the issuer. A c o u p o n  b o n d ,  on the other hand, is 
payable to  the "bearer." This is the more frequent form, comprising 90% 
of all bonds. 
But the concept of "bearer" raises the interesting and potentially 
knotty question, "bearer of what?". Our treatment of financial instru- 
ments thus far has regarded them as abstract objects, what we have 
called "promissory" objects. The physical representation (document) on 
which t h s  promise is expressed has so far not been of importance. 
If we consider only the promissory object, we would view the promise 
to be made to some indefinite recipient who is the owner of that promise 
on some given date. Thus, the promisee would be indicated within the 
elaboration of the promise as its owner as  of some future date: 
Here the promise p is the obligation that for whoever owns p. x will give 
them ml (some money). 
Thls however is a logical anomaly, a so-called "self-referring" expres- 
sion. Substitution of p in the argument of OWN here leads to an infinite 
regress. 
In addition, there is a pragmatic problem with this definition. The 
promissory object, p, is merely an  artifice; an  abstraction without physi- 
cal reality. Given that many people might claim to be the owner of this 
promise on the date tl, how is the company to identify which is the real 
one? In the case of coupon bonds (or any bearer bonds for that matter), 
the issuer generally does not keep a record of the promisees. The whole 
point of a coupon bond is to be able to trade them without notifying the 
issuer. How, then, does the issuer know who to pay? The actual mechan- 
ism involved is a book containing physical coupons, one for each promised 
payment. These coupons operate effectively as post-dated checks of 
specified amounts, but with the recipient left unspecified. After any par- 
ticular date is reached, the holder of t h s  book removes the appropriate 
coupon and cashes it at  a bank. ThLs physical book is thus an "authorita- 
tive document" in that its purpose is not only informative, containing 
information which can copied as is the case with other information 
objects, but also pmfomnt ive ,  in that the promissory object in this case 
is identified with t h s  unique physical object. Note that t h s  performative 
aspect cannot be reproduced in a photocopy (except under false 
pretense). Designating t h s  book by the variable x, the previous formula 
would now read: 
Thus, a t  least in the case of coupon bonds, any change in ownership of the 
promissory object must also be accompanied by a corresponding change 
of ownershp of the coupon book. Ths  is expressed: 
( ~ p )  COUPON-BOND(p) -+ ( L  z) AUTH-~0C(z,p) & 
(VX) (Wy) OCHANGE!(x,y,p) --, PCHANGE! (x,y,z) 
Note that  here we a re  describing subsequent trading of the coupon bond. 
The original issuance of t h s  bond would be as follows. Let us presume 
that  the bond involves n3 equal size interest payments of size nl ,  paid 
over intervals of length t2, and that on the final interest payment the 
principal in the amount n2 is repaid. 
This is read as follows. First there is an ownershp change of the authori- 
tative document, x. Next, the obligation decomposes into two major 
bracketed expressions. The first expression involves an iteration. The 
reading of each iteration is as follows. t3[i] is the time preceding the ith 
iteration. I t  therefore begins as to ends and is i times t l  intervals long. 
t4[i] is the time span covering the ith interval. I t  begins as t3[i] ends and 
is tz long. Then, for some money in the arnoung nl, and for any person 
who owns the coupon book z at  the beginning point of this  t ime ,  x is 
obllged to give them this money during this time. 
The second bracketed expression is structurally similar but without 
the iteration. Whoever owns the coupon book a t  the beginning of the kth 
iteration also gets the princial. 
Another important concept with regard to bonds is that  of co l la t e ra l .  
As we have mentioned earlier, promises of the sort considered here are 
generally enforceable by a legal process of some governmental body. 
With certain debts, however, a more specific enforcement is included in 
the terms of the contract, namely the lender's privilege to take owner- 
ship of some asset in the event of the borrower's default. Thus the 
borrower's promise includes an ob l iga t i on  to the lender to pay some 
amount(s) of money, as well as  the borrower's p e r m i s s i o n  to the lender to 
take some asset if the payments are not made. Note that  the lender does 
not have to take the asset, but may. To express this, we make use of the  
connective OE ("or else") developed earlier for deontic expressions. 
Let x and y be respectively, borrower and lender. Let Q be a tem- 
porally unbound formula indicating x's promised payment actions and let 
t l  be the period in whlch Q us supposed to occur and let x be the colla- 
teral object. A collateral promise might be as follows: 
COLLATERAL-PROMISE!!(x,y,Q,tl,z) : := 
(3 p) PROMISE!! (x,y,p) & 
p = "[[0(x,y): RD(tl) Q] OE 
[P (tjt2) : Beg(t2)=End(tl) & RD(t2) OTAKE!! (y,x,z)]] 
The promise reads as  follows: for all times t2 following t ,  it is obligated to 
realize during t l  the action Q; or else it  is permissible that  y takes owner- 
ship of the object z from x. 
Equity Instruments 
Equity instruments are the various types of corporate stock. The two 
principal types are common and preferred.  Common stock corresponds 
most closely with the ordinary concept of "ownership" of the corporation. 
Each share of common stock permits the holder to  one vote in the elec- 
tion of the company's board of directors (usually; there have been excep- 
tions). 
Beyond that ,  however, the stockholder has little direct influence on 
the  firm's everyday operations nor can he/she legally dispose of any of 
the  firm's assets without the permission of the management or board. 
Common (as well as preferred) stockholders are  not responsible for the 
corporation's debts. If the firm goes bankrupt, creditors have no claim to 
the stockholder's personal estate. 
If the firm is liquidated without bankruptcy, common stockholders 
have a residual claim to  the assets--they get  whatever is left after all 
debts have been satisfied as well as whatever claims preferred 
stockholder's might have. 
We find t h s  to be a quite different form of "ownership" than the oth- 
e r s  we have considered. For that reason, we have expressly ezcluded i t  in 
the  definition of our OWN predicate. While stockholders are seen to OWN 
their stock, they are  not seen to OWN the corporation itself. Rather, the 
stock is regarded as a promise, essentially no different than the promises 
involved in debts, to whch the corporation has a commitment. 
The details of these promises are rather vague however. Roughly, 
they are contingent obligations on the part  of the firm to  eventually dis- 
tribute cash dividends, and/or accumulate valuable assets withn the firm 
which may be eventually converted to cash on liquidation. Seldom, if 
ever, are these commitments ever articulated however. (Certainly they 
exist or else the stock would have no value.) 
Given the vagueness and complexity of the corporation's agreement 
with its stockholders, we are forced (at least for the moment), to accept 
this as a primitive type of promise, viz. COMMON-STOCK. Thus for a cor- 
poration, c, and a stockholder, x, we would describe their relationshp as 
follows: 
(Recall that by the definition of PROMISE!!, x afterwards OWNS p.) 
Preferred stock is conceptually something of an intermediate 
category between bonds and common stock. It often does not have voting 
privileges, and sometimes is only contingently voting, e.g., only under 
certain adverse circumstances. In the event of liquidation, preferred 
stockholder's claims come after those of bond holders but before com- 
mon stockholders. Also, the nature of the firm's promise is usually more 
definite with preferred stock than with common, but usually contains 
contingency provisions not found in bonds. 
There is a wide range of variations written into the terms of pre- 
ferred stock issues. Often there is a fixed dividend rate set, whch is pay- 
able provided the firm realizes adequate earnings. Sometimes t h s  divi- 
dend obligation is made cumulative, so that a missed dividend one period 
is added to the dividend promised for the following period. Other terms 
are also variously included, such as  call and sinking fund provisions allow- 
ing the firm to retire t h s  stock if it chooses. 
Unlike bond holders, preferred stockholders cannot legally enforce 
arrearages in dividends, though these dividends do take priority over divi- 
dends to  common stockholders. Ths  lack of legal enforcement is prob- 
lematic in CANDID, since we have presumed that our deontic operators 
have the force of law. To give an  example of what a preferred stock might 
look like in CANDID, let us assume a firm, x, writes a preferred stock to a 
party, y, promising a cumulative dividend interval tl  (e.g., every year) in 
the amount n. Assume the stock is issued in time to and that  any divi- 
dends paid will be paid within t2 (e.g., a month) time following the end of 
the  operating interval t l  (e.g. ,  the fiscal year end). The notion of a divi- 
dend contingent on adequate income, would also necessitate an event 
predicate, Income!(x), whch  would test for sufficient income. 
CUMULATIVE-PREFERRED STOCK! ! (x, y , to, t , ,  t2,n) : : = 
( 3  p) PROMISE!! (x,y,p) & 
p = A[o(x,y): [ I  s i < *I: 
(3m1[iI> ts (ml[ i l>=n 
(3ts[il) (3  t4[il): 
Beg(t3[i])=End(to) & Dur(t4[i],tl)=(i - 1) & 
Beg(t3[i])=End(t3[i]) & Dur(t,[i],t,)=l & 
( I t d i l )  Beg(t5[il)=End(t4[il) & 
Dur(t5[i],t2)=l & 
( I  ts[il> Beg(to[il)=End(t4[il) & 
[RT(t4[i]) Income(x)] 
[RD(t,[i]) OGIVE! !(x,y,ml[i])] & 
"[RD(t4[i]) 1nc ome! (x)] - 
[RD(t6[i]) OGNE!!(x,y,ml[i])]] 
Reading: on each of an indefinite number of iterations, it is obligatory 
that  for some money in the amount n ,  and for times t4 (e.g., the current 
year), t5 ( a short period following t4) and te (an unlimited period following 
t,), if there is income in t3 x must pay the dividend during t5; if there is no 
income in t4, x must pay the dividend during te. 
Convertibles 
Certain bonds and preferred stock are "convertible." This means 
that  the holder has the option to exchange them for the issuing 
company's common stock at some specified exchange rate. This option 
aspect of convertibles is structurally similar to that of puts and calls. We 
describe t h s  convertible aspect as a s e p a r a t e  p r o m i s e  t ak ing  t h e  f o r m  of 
an opt ion t o  e zchange  t h e  current promise, pl ,  by the company (that of 
the bond or preferred stock) for another promise, pz, (that of common 
stock). 
Let us assume for issuer x and holder y this option applies for the 
period t1 and that y must respond within t4 amount of time. Then, the 
issuance of this option would be as follows: 
CONVERTIBLE-OPTION!! (x,y,pl,pz,tl,tz) ::= 
PROMISE!! (x,y,pl) & 
PI = A [ o ( x , ~ ) :  (vt3) ( 3 4 ) :  
PT(ts,tl) & Beg(t4)=End(t3) & Dur(t4,tz)=l & 
Reading: x promises y that if for any time t3 during t , ,  y gives back own- 
ership of the promise p, then x is obliged to give to y the promise p2 
within the time t, (of length t2) whch immediately follows. 
III-E. CONCLUDING KE- 
This completes our list of sample financial instruments described 
using CANDID. The preceding was of course only a tutorial survey illus- 
trating how CANDID can be used to represent financial and commercial 
concepts. 
As indicated in the introduction, the motivation behind the develop- 
ment of this calculus was to serve as a representation language for 
knowledge bases in artificia!!~ intelligent managerial decision support 
systems. 
Definitions such as these would therefore serve as the basis for 
inferencing in decision aiding applications for instance in evaluating a 
firm's financial statements, evaluating financing alternatives, verification 
and monitoring of contracts, etc. 
Also, the implementation of t h s  language in a deductive computer 
system would assist in the verification of the definitions. Even at this 
tutorial level, some of the definitions approached a level of complexity 
that was difficult to follow. As further, more detailed concepts are 
included, mental verification would become even more difficult, and the 
assistance of the computer in thls process would be useful. 
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